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PUTTING THE COMMERCE BACK IN THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE: STATE TAXES, STATE
SUBSIDIES, AND COMMERCE NEUTRALITY
Ryan Lirette and Alan D. Viard
The unpredictability of the Supreme Court’s dormant Commerce
Clause (“DCC”) jurisprudence continues to draw trenchant
criticism from commentators and the Justices themselves, as the
Court remains unable to explain which state taxes and subsidies
impede interstate commerce. We show that these problems can be
resolved by a Commerce Neutrality framework requiring that state
taxes and subsidies provide a combined treatment of inbound and
outbound transactions at least as favorable as their treatment of
intrastate transactions. This simple test has an economic foundation
because taxes and subsidies that violate it create incentives to
engage in intrastate rather than interstate transactions. The
Supreme Court recently took an important step toward
implementing this framework in Maryland Comptroller v. Wynne,
135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015), when it invalidated Maryland’s income tax
scheme based on economic analysis similar to that presented in this
article.
The simple Commerce Neutrality condition resembles the
Court’s oft-used, but poorly explained, internal consistency test. At
the same time, Commerce Neutrality simplifies DCC jurisprudence
by sweeping away the Court’s flawed call for equal treatment of outof-state and in-state parties (as opposed to equal treatment of
interstate and intrastate transactions), its half-hearted concern
about multiple taxation, and its ill-defined concept of external
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consistency. And, because Commerce Neutrality applies to subsidies
on the same terms as taxes, it eliminates the tax-subsidy confusion
that has figured so prominently in analyses of the DCC.
By focusing on the prevention of discrimination against
interstate commerce, Commerce Neutrality puts the commerce back
in the Dormant Commerce Clause.
INTRODUCTION
Almost forty years ago, the Supreme Court overhauled its
dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”) tax jurisprudence in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady.1 In doing so, the Court sought to inject
clarity and economic reality into a doctrine that had lacked both
since its nineteenth-century conception.2 Yet despite this doctrinal
shift, DCC tax jurisprudence has continued to exhibit the
incoherence that has long hampered the Supreme Court’s efforts to
protect interstate commerce from abusive state taxation. This
incoherence has posed significant difficulties for state courts, which
hear most DCC challenges.3 As Judge Morris B. Hoffman of
Colorado’s District Court recently observed, “the [Supreme] Court’s
pronouncements about the reach of the dormant restriction have
waxed and waned for more than a century, have been profoundly

1

See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Id. at 279 (noting that “the present state of the law . . . has no relationship
to economic realities” and “stands only as a trap for the unwary draftsman”).
3
The Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”) provides that the U.S. District Courts
“shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax
under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the
courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). Even when the TIA does not
apply, comity may preclude federal court review of challenges to state taxes. See,
e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
The TIA generally applies, regardless of whether the suits seek to lower taxes on
interstate transactions or increase taxes on intrastate transactions. Levin v.
Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413 (2010). In contrast, U.S. District Courts
normally have jurisdiction, concurrent with state trial courts, over DCC
challenges to state spending programs, which are not subject to the TIA and are
generally unaffected by the comity doctrine.
2
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under-theorized, and as a result have produced breathtakingly
inconsistent results.”4
Judge Hoffman’s comments should come as no surprise.
Numerous commentators have criticized the DCC’s incoherence
and unpredictability.5 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has often
acknowledged the validity of these criticisms.6
These difficulties have served as a staging ground for originalist
and textualist attacks on the foundations of the DCC.7 The
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce and says nothing about restricting states’ regulation of
4
Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 13CV34855, slip op. at
11 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014).
5
See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION: THE CASE FOR
GREATER UNIFORMITY 56 (1993) [hereinafter SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN
TAXATION] (“[L]egal doctrine in the state and local tax area is shot through with
uneasy juxtapositions and outright contradictions.”); Edward A. Zelinsky,
Restoring Politics to the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Case for Abandoning
the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discriminatory Taxation, 29 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 29, 36 (2002) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the DCC]
(“[T]he indeterminacy of the nondiscrimination principle goes beyond the
incoherence of the tax/subsidy distinction to the futility in this context of the very
concept of nondiscriminatory taxation.”).
6
Wardair Can. Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (lamenting the “cloudy
waters” of DCC doctrine); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318,
329 (1977) (quoting Nw. States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
457 (1959)) (noting in a unanimous opinion that its case-by-case approach to the
DCC has left “much room for controversy or confusion and little in way of precise
guides to the States”); Nw. States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 457–58
(calling DCC jurisprudence a “quagmire” that resembled a “tangled underbrush”).
7
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the DCC is inconsistent with the
constitution’s text, the historical record of the founding period, and lacks a
“governing principle”); Id. at 1812 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the
unworkability of the dormant commerce clause and that it is “highly implausible
that those who ratified the Commerce Clause understood it” to apply to their
states’ income taxes); see also Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course
Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97
VA. L.R., 1877, 1878 (noting that “the current Supreme Court’s most originalist
members have mounted a sustained attack on the dormant . . . Commerce Clause”
and discussing their efforts to attack the “textual and historical bona fides of the
dormant Commerce Clause”).
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interstate commerce. In 1997, Justice Thomas, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote in dissent that “[t]he
negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the text of the
Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually
unworkable in application.”8 Likewise, in 2015, Justice Scalia in
dissent, joined by Justice Thomas, labeled the DCC a “judicial
fraud” that the Court “tend[s] to revamp . . . every couple of decades
upon finding existing decisions unworkable or unsatisfactory.”9
Justice Scalia argued that this uncertain treatment resulted in “a
bestiary of ad hoc tests and ad hoc exceptions.”10 Given the lack of
textual foundation for the DCC, the critics’ points deserve
consideration.
Although a definitive assessment of the DCC’s constitutional
validity is beyond the scope of this article, if the DCC is to remain
in place, it must be firmly grounded in a framework that is clearly
defined and fully embraces economic reality. As we explain in this
article, the appropriate framework is “Commerce Neutrality.” This
framework focuses on whether a state tax or subsidy creates
economic disincentives for interstate commerce and thereby
promotes the division of the nation into separate economic units, an
outcome that the Court has referred to as “economic
Balkanization.”11
Under Commerce Neutrality, state taxes and subsidies are
invalid if they discriminate against interstate commerce by creating
an economic incentive for in-state parties to engage in transactions
with other in-state parties rather than out-of-state parties.12 As we
8

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610–
11 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
9
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1808 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11
Id. at 1794 (majority opinion) (noting that the Commerce Clause “reflected
a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union
would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had
plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation”).
12
See infra Section II.A. The Commerce Neutrality analysis is also set forth
in an amicus brief filed by one of the authors and other economists. See Brief for
the Tax Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Comptroller of the
Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No.13-485) at 1
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will show, a tax system has that forbidden effect if the combined tax
on interstate transactions, which includes both inbound and
outbound transactions, exceeds the tax on intrastate transactions.13
Conversely, a subsidy system has that effect if the subsidy to
intrastate transactions exceeds the combined subsidy to inbound and
outbound transactions.
This simple rule—a comparison of the combined treatment of
inbound and outbound transactions to the treatment of intrastate
transactions—provides a unified framework for evaluating the range
of taxes and subsidies that the Court has considered. It rationalizes
many of the Court’s holdings and resolves the puzzles that have
arisen in DCC jurisprudence.
From one perspective, Commerce Neutrality is already rooted in
the Court’s current analysis. It is simply the economic
implementation of the Complete Auto requirement that state taxes
do not discriminate against interstate commerce.14 Moreover, in
most circumstances, Commerce Neutrality is identical to the Court’s
oft-used internal consistency test. Under the internal consistency
test, a state’s tax system violates the DCC if, in a hypothetical world
in which all of the other states copied the tax system, interstate
transactions would bear a heavier nationwide tax burden than
intrastate transactions.15 The Court recently reaffirmed the internal
consistency test and, for the first time, applied it to individual
income taxation in Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v.
Wynne.16 Although the internal consistency test is often derided as
an abstraction detached from economic reality, the commerce
neutrality analysis demonstrates that those criticisms are incorrect
[hereinafter
Tax
Economists
Brief],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_previ
ew/BriefsV4/13-485_resp_amcu_te.pdf.
13
See infra Section II.B. An inbound transaction is one between an out-ofstate seller and in-state buyer and an outbound transaction is one between an instate seller and out-of-state buyer.
14
See infra Section II.B.
15
See discussion infra Section III.A (demonstrating that the internal
consistency test is equivalent to the Commerce Neutrality condition except when
the state makes its taxes or subsidies dependent on other states’ taxes or
subsidies).
16
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802–03.
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and that the test generally provides a real-world economic
assessment of whether state policies discriminate against interstate
commerce.
In other ways, however, Commerce Neutrality diverges sharply
from the morass of the Court’s current DCC jurisprudence. It offers
clear and workable guidelines for judges and state legislators and
resolves many of the doctrinal problems in DCC jurisprudence
while preserving state autonomy to adopt policies that do not
discriminate against interstate commerce. For example, the Supreme
Court has often stated that multiple taxation (the taxation of a
transaction by two or more states) is a potential DCC problem, but
has failed to identify the circumstances under which it is
impermissible.17 Commerce Neutrality resolves these complications
by demonstrating that multiple taxation is not a constitutional
problem, so long as each state’s tax system is nondiscriminatory; no
state with a nondiscriminatory tax system is obligated to
accommodate, or defer to, another state’s tax system to avoid
“multiple taxation.”18 The Commerce Neutrality analysis also
makes clear that the DCC fair-apportionment requirement is merely
an application of the nondiscrimination requirement, eliminating illdefined auxiliary concepts such as external consistency and the
unitary-business principle.19
Commerce Neutrality’s insistence on equal treatment of
interstate and intrastate commerce squarely exposes the flaws in a
rival concept that requires equal treatment of in-state and out-ofstate parties (“the out-of-stater-equality principle”). Although the
Court and commentators have sometimes conflated that principle
with nondiscrimination against interstate commerce,20 the two
concepts are profoundly incompatible. The Court’s flirtation with
the out-of-stater-equality principle has complicated DCC
17
See discussion infra Section III.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s
inconsistent use of the multiple taxation principle).
18
See infra Section II.D.
19
See infra Section VII.C (discussing the external consistency requirement
that business income apportionment formulas accurately reflect the division of
income between states and the unitary business principle’s requirement that a state
apply its apportionment formula only to those affiliated firms that are within the
unitary business operating within the state).
20
See infra Part VI.
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jurisprudence because the principle unreasonably insists that states
treat their citizens, whom they have the power to tax and the duty to
serve, the same as the rest of the nation’s population.21 Consistent
application of the principle would uphold import and export tariffs,
the paradigm example of discrimination against interstate
commerce,22 because, contrary to initial impressions, tariffs provide
equal treatment to in-state and out-of-state parties.23 Commerce
Neutrality reveals that the import tariff’s real flaw is that it impedes
interstate commerce by penalizing transactions between out-of-state
sellers and in-state buyers, not that it discriminates against out-ofstate parties.
Commerce Neutrality also resolves the quagmire surrounding
the DCC’s application to subsidies. Because virtually all subsidies
favor in-state parties and in-state production, consistent application
of the out-of-stater-equality principle would require the invalidation
of an array of widely accepted subsidies, a conclusion that
commentators and the Court have struggled to avoid.24 Commerce
Neutrality resolves these problems by discarding the out-of-staterequality principle and striking down only those subsidies that favor
intrastate transactions over interstate transactions while upholding
subsidies to in-state parties and production that are neutral between
intrastate and interstate transactions. The validity of subsidies can
be evaluated under the same internal consistency test that applies to
taxes.
Commerce Neutrality also has a connection to the text and
purposes of the Commerce Clause that other standards lack.25 The
clause does not mention equal treatment of out-of-staters; instead, it
gives Congress power to regulate “commerce among the several
States.”26 An economic inquiry into how to protect the free flow of
that commerce, the DCC’s historical purpose, leads directly to
21

Id.
See, e.g., Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804 (“[T]ariffs are [t]he paradigmatic
example of a law discriminating against interstate commerce.” (second alteration
in original) (quoting W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193
(1994))).
23
See infra Section VI.A.1.
24
See infra Section VI.B.
25
See infra Section III.B.
26
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
22
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Commerce Neutrality. In that respect, Commerce Neutrality puts the
“commerce” back in the dormant Commerce Clause.
Part I of the article provides a brief background of the DCC. Part
II explains the basics of Commerce Neutrality and Part III describes
its relationship to internal consistency and the purposes of the DCC.
Part IV applies Commerce Neutrality to personal income taxation
and discusses Wynne. Part V discusses facial neutrality and the
implementation challenge of identifying de facto discrimination.
Part VI explains how Commerce Neutrality resolves the confusion
about the out-of-stater-equality principle and the DCC’s treatment
of subsidies. Part VII discusses apportionment.
I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
NONDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE
An analysis of the foundations of DCC jurisprudence and
modern case law demonstrate that Commerce Neutrality’s sole
focus on invalidating state taxes and subsidies that discriminate
against interstate commerce is appropriate.
A. DCC Foundation
The Constitution’s Commerce Clause states, “Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”27 Although the clause is phrased as a grant of power to
Congress, the Supreme Court has long interpreted it to include the
DCC, a dormant restriction on state authority to burden interstate
commerce.28 That restriction, however, operates only as a
presumptive implementation of Congress’s intent, as Congress may
authorize states to adopt policies that would otherwise violate the
DCC.29 Yet throughout the history of its DCC jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has struggled to fashion coherent rules
implementing this latent intent.

27

Id.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794.
29
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (upholding
federally authorized state tax on out-of-state insurance companies).
28
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In 1852, years after it began speculating about the DCC’s
existence, the Court first formally recognized the doctrine in Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, holding that the Commerce Clause’s grant of
power to Congress is exclusive when the area regulated demands a
uniform national policy.30 But Cooley’s framework soon proved
unworkable and gave way to a formalistic test that sought to
distinguish policies that directly burdened interstate commerce from
those that only indirectly burdened interstate commerce.31 In
practice, however, the indirect/direct distinction was applied
“indiscriminately” and also proved unworkable.32 This troubled
analysis continued well into the twentieth century with only
sporadic attempts to adopt an approach grounded in economic
reality.33 By 1959, it had become clear that “the use of magic words
or labels” could “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.”34
Yet even during this period of legal formalism, the Court was
committed to invalidating laws that discriminated against interstate
commerce.35 That was especially true in the late nineteenth century.
In 1875’s Welton v. Missouri, the Court invalidated Missouri’s
discriminatory licensing tax based on the premise that national
uniformity, and thus exclusive Commerce Clause jurisdiction under
Cooley, was necessary to protect interstate commerce from
30

Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 52 U.S. 299, 319 (1852); see also Norman R.
Williams, Gibbons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398, 1398 (2004) (noting that “Cooley
refined a pre-existing understanding of the Commerce Clause that Chief Justice
John Marshall first articulated over twenty-five years earlier in the seminal case
Gibbons v. Ogden”).
31
See, e.g., In re State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. 232, 278 (1873) (invalidating a
tax upon the “freight carried” in interstate commerce); Fisher’s Blend Station, Inc.
v. State Taxation, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) (invalidating tax because it was an
instrumentality of interstate commerce).
32
Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1114 (2000).
33
W. Livestock & J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938)
(attempting to adopt a “multiple taxation” approach that would uphold taxes so
long as they were properly apportioned).
34
Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 441 (1959).
35
Brandon Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 441 (2008) [hereinafter Denning,
Reconstructing the DCC Doctrine] (noting that the nondiscrimination principle
became “virile” in the late nineteenth century).
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discriminatory legislation.36 In doing so, the Welton Court equated
Congress’s silence on the issue to “a declaration that inter-State
commerce shall be free and untrammeled.”37 Relying on Welton, the
Court struck down a variety of discriminatory state laws in the late
nineteenth century, including facially neutral laws with
discriminatory effects.38 Since then, the Court has repeatedly
reaffirmed the nondiscrimination principle, describing a
discriminatory policy as “virtually per se” invalid under the DCC.39
Commerce Neutrality’s focus on nondiscrimination therefore
comports with longstanding DCC doctrine.
B. Modern DCC Tax Jurisprudence and Nondiscrimination
The Court cast aside the formalism of previous eras in its muchheralded Complete Auto decision, which unanimously upheld
Mississippi’s tax on interstate transportation carriers for the
privilege of doing business within the state.40 Citing the need for an
analysis related to “economic reality,”41 the Court outlined a fourpronged test under which a state tax is consistent with the DCC. The
conditions of the test require that the tax: “[1] [be] applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly

36

Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875); Martin H. Redish & Shane
V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of
Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 579–80.
37
Welton, 91 U.S. at 282.
38
Robbins v. Shelby Cty. Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489 (1887) (invalidating a
facially neutral law and noting that “[w]hen goods are sent from one state to
another for sale, or, in consequence of a sale, they become part of its general
property, and amenable to its laws; provided that no discrimination be made
against them as goods from another state, and that they be not taxed by reason of
being brought from another state, but only taxed in the usual way as other goods
are”); Denning, supra note 35, at 442–44.
39
See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338 (2007); Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429
U.S. 318, 332 n.12, 335–36; Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646
(1994); Chem. Waste Mgmt. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992).
40
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 274–75, 289 (1977).
41
See id. at 279, 288–89 (rejecting the “Spector rule” which the Court found
to have “no relationship to economic realities”).
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apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against inter-state commerce,
and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”42
Although Complete Auto requires courts to assess state taxes
based on these four elements, Commerce Neutrality rightly focuses
only on nondiscrimination. This is for several reasons. First, as we
discuss below, the prong assessing whether a tax is fairly related to
a state’s services has been largely ignored by the court, rendering it
a non-factor in DCC jurisprudence.43 Second, the nexus requirement
is a separate limitation that pertains to the geographical limitations
of state sovereignty and that is best handled through the due process
clause.44 Finally, the apportionment prong is not an independent
concept but is merely an application of the nondiscrimination
requirement.45 Commerce Neutrality offers the best interpretation of
the nondiscrimination requirement embodied in the Court’s
precedents and codified in Complete Auto.
II. THE BASICS OF COMMERCE NEUTRALITY
A. The Meaning of Commerce Neutrality
A tax or subsidy system satisfies Commerce Neutrality if it can
avoid giving sellers and buyers in each state any incentive to switch
from interstate to intrastate transactions. Taxes and subsidies
generally change the prices at which transactions take place; for
example, sellers of a good are likely to raise prices if they are taxed
on their sales.46 A tax or subsidy system is commerce neutral if there
is a set of possible price changes that do not give any buyers or
sellers a disincentive to trade with parties in other states. Such a
system should generally be upheld, regardless of the price changes
that actually occur, because it does not systematically discourage
interstate transactions relative to intrastate transactions.47 To
42

Id. at 279.
See infra Section II.B.
44
See infra note 49.
45
See infra Part VII.
46
HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GAYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 307–12 (9th ed. 2010)
(presenting economic model of price increases resulting from taxes on sellers).
47
One caveat that concerns de facto discrimination against interstate
commerce. See infra Section V.B.
43
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determine which tax and subsidy systems satisfy that property,
courts and legislatures can utilize a simple tax-rate condition that
applies to both taxes and subsidies. The condition requires that the
combined treatment of interstate transactions in both directions be
at least as favorable as the treatment of intrastate transactions.48
We illustrate the nondiscrimination condition with a simple
example involving two states, A and B. There are then four types of
transactions, two intrastate and two interstate. One type of intrastate
transaction involves a state-A buyer and state-A seller, and the other
type involves a state-B buyer and a state-B seller. One type of
interstate transaction involves a state-A buyer and state-B seller; this
is an inbound transaction from the perspective of state A and an
outbound transaction from the perspective of state B. The other type
of interstate transaction involves a state-B buyer and state-A seller;
this is an inbound transaction for state B and an outbound
transaction for state A. We assume that neither state can tax the
intrastate transactions within the other state because it would lack
nexus to do so.49
Under these assumptions, a tax or subsidy system is commerce
neutral if possible price changes exist such that the taxes and price
changes, taken together, do not incentivize any of the four groups to
switch from interstate to intrastate transactions. The taxes and price
changes must not give state-A sellers an incentive to switch from
state-B buyers to state-A buyers or give state-B sellers an incentive
48

This condition is closely related to the Court’s internal consistency test.
See infra Section III.A.
49
This territorial limitation on state authority is best interpreted not as
protecting interstate commerce, but as protecting individuals from being subject
to conflicting obligations imposed by other sovereigns. Recognizing that this
aspect of the nexus requirement is unrelated to the protection of interstate
commerce, the Court has grounded it in the Due Process Clause rather than the
DCC. Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). The nexus requirement
in the first prong of the Complete Auto test serves the distinct purpose, which lies
outside the scope of this article, of limiting tax compliance burdens on out-ofstate parties to interstate transactions. Id. at 312–13; cf. MICHAEL S. GREVE, THE
UPSIDE-DOWN CONSTITUTION 69–71 (2012) (territorial limitation is essential
non-textual component of original constitutional design); Bradley W. Joondeph,
Rethinking the Role of the Dormant Commerce Clause in State Tax Jurisdiction,
24 VA. TAX REV. 109, 114 (2004) (territorial limitation derives from broader
constitutional prohibition on extraterritorial jurisdiction).
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to switch from state-A buyers to state-B buyers. Similarly, they must
not give state-A buyers an incentive to switch from state-B sellers
to state-A sellers or give state-B buyers an incentive to switch from
state-A sellers to state-B sellers.
This framework encompasses a wide array of transactions and
taxes. Although the above example refers to taxes on the purchase
and sales of goods, the framework, like the Court’s application of
the DCC, extends to state taxes on other transactions, such as
income payments and asset purchases.50 The interstate transaction
may even involve a single taxpayer conducting some activities in
one state and other activities in a different state.
The breadth of the analysis is important because any tax can be
designed to selectively discriminate against interstate transactions.
Although a property tax explicitly applies to property ownership
rather than to transactions, a property tax that applies to in-state
property only if it is used to provide services to out-of-staters
indirectly taxes exports in a discriminatory manner.51
The Court has consistently held that discriminatory treatment of
interstate commerce violates the DCC, without regard to the size of
the violation and without requiring empirical demonstrations of the
magnitude, or even the existence, of actual reductions in the volume
50

See, e.g., Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329
(1977) (applying DCC to tax on securities transactions); Comptroller of the
Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1798–99 (2015) (applying DCC to
individual income taxation).
51
See infra Section III.A (discussing Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)); cf. Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury,
498 U.S. 358, 374 (1991) (“[T]ax on sleeping measured by the number of pairs of
shoes you have in your closet is a tax on shoes.” (quoting Jenkins, State Taxation
of Interstate Commerce, 27 TENN. L. REV. 239, 242 (1960))). As the Court stated
in 1997 and repeated in 2015, “[a] tax on real estate, like any other tax, may
impermissibly burden interstate commerce.” Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1797 (quoting
Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 574). The Court has also said that states cannot
“circumvent the prohibition of the Commerce Clause against placing burdensome
taxes on out-of-state transactions by burdening those transactions with a tax that
is levied in the aggregate . . . rather than on individual transactions.”
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 404 (1984); cf. Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 448 (1827) (rejecting the “distinction between a tax on
the thing imported, and on the person of the importer,” in the context of the
Export-Import Clause).
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of interstate commerce.52 The Court has not, however, been able to
identify which treatment is discriminatory. Commerce Neutrality
provides a simple tax-rate condition that nondiscriminatory tax and
subsidy systems must satisfy.
B. The Tax-Rate Condition
We now derive a condition that can be used to test whether a tax
or subsidy system satisfies Commerce Neutrality. The condition is
expressed as a relationship between the tax rates on inbound
transactions, outbound transactions, and intrastate transactions.
We use t to refer to state A’s tax rates and T to refer to state B’s
tax rates. Let tAA be the tax rate that state A imposes on its intrastate
transactions and TBB be the rate that state B imposes on its intrastate
transactions.53 We quote tax rates in tax-inclusive form, which
expresses the tax as a fraction of the total price, including the tax
itself. For example, suppose the buyer pays a total price of $100, of
52

See, e.g., Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 406–07 (“When a tax, on its face, is
designed to have discriminatory economic effects, the Court need not know how
unequal the Tax is before concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates.”
(quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981))); New Energy Co. v.
Limbach,
486
U.S.
269,
276
(“Where
discrimination
is
patent, . . . [no] . . . widespread [effects] . . . need be shown.”); Associated Indus.
v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 650 (stating that the “magnitude and scope of the
discrimination have no bearing on the determinative question whether
discrimination occurred”); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333 n.3
(rejecting a “de minimis defense to a charge of discriminatory taxation”); Camps
Newfound, 520 U.S. at 581 n.15 (rejecting the need for particularized showing
that any potential camper decided not to attend plaintiff’s camp due to
discriminatory tax). The Court has allowed a few exceptions to the DCC, but they
lie outside the scope of this article. The market-participant exception allows states
to discriminate against interstate commerce when they are buying and selling
rather than exercising governmental power. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). A related exception allows state governments to
monopolize a line of business with their residents. See United Haulers Ass’n, Inc.
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007). Also, states
need not achieve full neutrality when doing so would impose undue administrative
costs. See infra Section II.E.
53
This analysis also applies to subsidies, with subsidy rates defined as
negative tax rates. See infra Section VI.B. For simplicity, however, we refer only
to taxes in the remainder of this section.
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which $20 is sent to the government as tax and $80 is retained by
the seller. The tax rate is 20% on a tax-inclusive basis because the
$20 tax is 20% of the $100 total price.54
Both states can tax the two categories of interstate transactions.
Let TAB be the tax rate that state B imposes on interstate transactions
featuring a state-A buyer and a state-B seller and let tAB be the tax
rate that state A imposes on those transactions. Similarly, let tBA be
the tax rate that state A imposes on interstate transactions featuring
a state-B buyer and a state-A seller and let TBA be the tax rate that
state B imposes on those transactions. Any tax imposed by the
seller’s state applies to only the payment that the seller receives, net
of any tax imposed by the buyer’s state.55
If the tax, by its terms, applies only to particular transactions and
taxpayers, then, for the present purpose of identifying facially
neutral tax systems, we apply the above analysis to those taxpayers
and those transactions. We ask whether there are potential price
changes for those transactions by those taxpayers, such that each of
the four groups (state-A buyers, state-B buyers, state-A sellers, and
state-B sellers) among them is not incentivized to switch between
intrastate and interstate versions of those transactions. For example,
if the tax applies only to potatoes purchased by high-income
taxpayers, we ask whether there are possible changes in the potato
prices paid by high-income taxpayers such that high-income potato
buyers in each state have no incentive to switch from sellers in the
other state to sellers in the buyer’s own state and potato sellers in
each state have no incentive to switch from high-income buyers in
the other state to high-income buyers in the seller’s own state. In
that analysis, we allow prices for products other than potatoes and

54

For comparison, the tax rate would be 25% on a tax-exclusive basis
because the $20 tax is 25% of the $80 net-of-tax price. The substantive results are
unaffected by how the tax rates are quoted.
55
Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll refer to this feature as an “ideal deduction”
for the buyer-state tax. See Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, What is Tax
Discrimination?, 121 YALE L.J. 1014, 1064–65 (2012) [hereinafter Mason &
Knoll, Tax Discrimination].
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potato prices paid by non-high-income buyers to remain
unchanged.56
Our analysis, which was derived independently of Ruth Mason
and Michael Knoll’s analysis of income tax policies that promote
“competitive neutrality,”57 is fully consistent with, but is a farreaching extension of, their analysis. Within the income tax context,
our results are the same as theirs. However, we extend the analysis
to apply to the full range of economic interactions between states,
not merely to workers earning income across state lines. That
extension makes the analysis applicable to all of the Court’s DCC
cases, not only those that concern the taxation of cross-border
income.58 The broader scope is intertwined with several other
changes in derivation and presentation. While Mason and Knoll
derive the neutrality conditions by analogy to the modern literature
on capital income taxation,59 we derive them from the longstanding
economic model of international trade.60 Although Mason and Knoll
describe neutral tax systems as those that allow participants in
interstate transactions to competitively outbid participants in
intrastate transactions if before-tax prices remained unchanged,61 we
adopt an economically equivalent description, in which neutral tax
systems are those for which prices can change to preserve relative
56

We extend the analysis to consider how facially neutral tax systems that
are limited to particular products and taxpayers may result in de facto
discrimination against interstate commerce. See infra Section V.B.
57
See Brief of Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason as Amici Curiae Supporting
of Respondents, Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787
(2015)
(No.
13-485)
[hereinafter
Knoll-Mason
Brief],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_previ
ew/BriefsV4/13-485_resp_amcu_msk-rm.pdf; Mason & Knoll, A Brief Sur-Reply
to Professors Graetz and Warren, 123 YALE L.J. 1 (2013); Mason & Knoll, Tax
Discrimination, supra note 55; Ruth Mason & Michael S. Knoll, Waiting for
Perseus: A Sur-Reply to Graetz and Warren, 67 TAX L. REV. 375 (2014).
58
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne and Kentucky
Department of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008), are among the few modern
DCC cases involving individual income taxation.
59
Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1021, 1036.
60
For a description of the standard economic model of trade, see PAUL R.
KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY & POLICY 111–33 (9th
ed. 2012).
61
Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1054.
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incentives for interstate transactions. Although we recognize the
concern about the proliferation of neutrality terminology,62 we have
coined the term “Commerce Neutrality” to describe the general
principle rather than adopting Mason and Knoll’s “competitive
neutrality” term.63 By focusing on commerce, the term reinforces
the applicability of the analysis to a wide range of commercial
interactions (some of which may not involve competition in a
narrow sense of that term) and emphasizes the link to the purposes
of the dormant commerce clause. Also, while Mason and Knoll state
the neutrality condition in terms of the kinds of uniform taxes that
can be imposed,64 we state the conditions in terms of tax rates, which
facilitates a more general analysis.65
Mathematical analysis66 reveals that Commerce Neutrality
requires that the state tax systems obey the following conditions:
(1) 26% & 2%6 $ 26% 2%6 * 2%% .
(2) +6% & +%6 $ +6% +%6 * +66 .
Accordingly, for each state’s tax system to satisfy Commerce
Neutrality, the sum of the tax rates on inbound and outbound
transactions, minus an interaction term, must be less than or equal
to the state’s tax on its intrastate transactions.67 The interaction term
62

See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL INCOME
TAXATION 14–15 (2014) (noting that commentators are “drowning in alphabet
soup” of neutrality principles with different acronyms).
63
Reflecting our debt to the trade literature, one of us used the term “trade
neutrality” in a previous article. See Alan D. Viard, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds
Balkanization for Some, But Not All, Bonds, 48 ST. TAX NOTES 889, 890 (2008).
64
Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1073–74.
65
Mason and Knoll also consider regimes in which discrimination against
interstate commerce by some states is offset by discrimination in favor of such
commerce by other states through unlimited tax credits. Id. at 1060–64; see infra
note 128.
66
See Ryan Lirette & Alan D. Viard, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce
and Income Flows: The Economics of Neutrality (Am. Enter. Inst. Econ. Pol’y,
Working Paper No. 2014-07, 2014), http://www.aei.org/publication/statetaxation-of-interstate-commerce-and-income-flows-the-economics-ofneutrality/; see infra Appendix I (discussing the key steps under “Deriving the
Tax-Rate Condition”).
67
The condition says “less than or equal” rather than “equal” because the
DCC permits states to discriminate in favor of interstate commerce. See
Associated Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 652 n.4 (1994).
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reflects the fact that the second tax is imposed only on the portion
of the price remaining after the first tax is paid.
It may seem surprising that the tax-rate condition depends on a
combination of taxes on two different transactions, inbound and
outbound, engaged in by different groups. Suppose that state A taxes
both inbound and intrastate transactions at 10%, with no tax on
outbound transactions, which satisfies Commerce Neutrality. If state
A then introduces a 10% outbound tax while keeping its 10% tax on
intrastate transactions, condition (1) requires that the 10% inbound
tax be removed. The initially permissible 10% tax on inbound
transactions has become impermissible due to the state’s imposition
of an apparently unrelated 10% tax on outbound transactions, which
are engaged in by other parties. The imposition of the outbound tax
makes the inbound tax impermissible because of how the two taxes
interact to determine the price changes needed to avoid incentives
to switch away from interstate commerce.
State A’s tax on outbound transactions reduces state-A sellers’
payoffs from those transactions by 10%. To counteract the resulting
incentive for those sellers to switch away from outbound
transactions, the price that they receive on intrastate sales must fall
by 10%. But, that price decline creates an incentive for state-A
buyers to switch away from inbound transactions toward the cheaper
intrastate purchases. To counteract that incentive, the 10% tax on
inbound transactions must be removed. We further discuss this
interdependence, which has also been recognized in the economic
literature of international income taxation,68 in section IV.A, in the
context of personal income taxation.
If states A and B impose taxes that exactly satisfy conditions (1)
and (2), then there is one mathematically possible set of relative
price changes that does not impair anyone’s incentive to engage in
interstate commerce. The prices paid by each state’s buyers, for
purchases from sellers in either state, rise by the amount of the tax
that the buyers’ state imposes on their purchases from the other state.
The after-tax payoffs received by each state’s sellers, from sales to
buyers in either state, fall by the amount of the tax that the sellers’

68

See Joel Slemrod et al., The Seesaw Principle in International Tax Policy,
65 J. PUB. ECON. 163 (1997).
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state impose on their sales to the other state.69 None of the buyers or
sellers has any incentive to switch from interstate to intrastate
transactions; the relative attractiveness of dealing with parties in the
other state and dealing with parties in their own state is unchanged.
Each state’s nondiscrimination condition is independent of the
other state’s condition. So long as state A obeys condition (1) and
state B obeys condition (2), Commerce Neutrality prevails, even if
the two states impose different tax rates or different mixes of taxes
on inbound and outbound transactions, and even if those differences
cause particular interstate transactions to face multiple taxation.
Neither state need provide credits for taxes paid to other states or
otherwise adjust its tax policies to accommodate the other state’s
policies.70
A recurring question concerns when a state may adopt taxes and
subsidies that disfavor interstate commerce to compensate for other
provisions that favor interstate commerce. As the Supreme Court
has noted, a compensatory provision is not invalid merely because
the state places it in a different statute than the provision for which
it compensates.71 However, allowing a state to justify discrimination
against interstate commerce by alleging that it provides preferential
treatment in unrelated areas would facilitate abuse because it would
be difficult to prevent one instance of preferential treatment from
being invoked to justify multiple instances of discriminatory
treatment in successive cases. In Oregon Wastes Systems, Inc. v.
Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon, the Court sensibly held
that a valid compensatory tax must offset an identifiable burden on
intrastate transactions in a way that roughly approximates, but does
not exceed, that burden and must be imposed on an event similar to
the event upon which the tax on intrastate transactions is imposed.72

69

Lirette & Viard, supra note 66, at 8.
Cf. Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1104–05
(justifying competitive neutrality model on the grounds that it limits
discrimination analysis to the review of just one state’s tax laws).
71
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–84 (1937) (upholding
use of tax on imports that compensated for retail sales tax on intrastate
transactions).
72
Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S 93, 103
(1994).
70
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The Court has also considered the extent to which disparities in
tax rates and disparities in government services can compensate for
each other.73 In principle, taxes should differ across interstate and
intrastate transactions to the extent that the marginal costs of the
associated government services differ. States, however, should not
be required to account for such cost differences, which are likely to
be small and difficult to measure. They should also not be allowed
to account for them to the detriment of interstate transactions unless
the levies are user fees that are linked to the costs of specific
services.74 Neutrality does not require that taxation of participants
in interstate and intrastate transactions be linked to the benefits they
receive from, or the total costs of providing, government services.
The Court was therefore correct to restate the Complete Auto prong
requiring that taxes be “fairly related to the services provided by the
State” as a requirement that the taxes be fairly related to the
taxpayer’s activities within the state.75
C. Destination and Origin Taxes
We now identify two types of taxes: destination taxes on
residents’ purchases and origin taxes on residents’ sales, which
satisfy condition (1) and are therefore commerce neutral. As we

73

See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331–32 (1996); Am. Trucking
Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 289 (1987).
74
In Fulton Corp., the Court correctly rejected North Carolina’s argument
that it could impose a higher tax on residents who owned shares in corporations
doing business out of state because the state maintained a capital market for
corporations wishing to sell stock to North Carolina residents, noting that the
state’s capital market regulations were financed by user fees rather than general
revenue and that the costs were too modest to justify the tax the state sought to
impose. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 335–38. In American Trucking Ass’ns v.
Scheiner, the Court rejected Pennsylvania’s attempt to justify its flat trucking
taxes as user fees because they did “not even purport to approximate fairly the
cost or value of the use of Pennsylvania’s roads.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 483 U.S.
at 290.
75
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 625–26, 629
(1981) (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977))
(restating the prong as a requirement that the tax be based on measures reasonably
related to the extent of the taxpayer’s in-state activities).
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explain, other commerce neutral tax systems are combinations of
origin and destination taxes.
Commerce Neutrality allows states to tax their residents’
purchases, provided that inbound interstate transactions are taxed no
more heavily than intrastate transactions. It also allows states to tax
their residents’ sales, provided that outbound interstate transactions
are taxed no more heavily than intrastate transactions. Furthermore,
it allows states to combine the two types of taxes. For each tax to be
nondiscriminatory, however, intrastate transactions, which include
both a purchase by residents and a sale by residents, must be fully
subject to both the tax on purchases and the tax on sales in a manner
that reflects the interaction term, as discussed below.
Because the tax-rate conditions (1) and (2) are symmetrical, we
only discuss State A and condition (1) in this section. And, because
the taxes that state A may levy do not depend on what state B does,
we make the simplifying assumption that state B imposes no taxes.
First, suppose that state A imposes a uniform tax on all
purchases by state-A buyers, both their intrastate purchases from
state-A sellers and their inbound purchases from state-B sellers.
Such a tax, which is imposed on purchases within the taxing
jurisdiction (and are therefore imposed on imports, but not exports),
is called a destination tax.76 Then, tAB = tAA, tBA is zero, and
condition (1) is satisfied. Incentives to engage in interstate
transactions are unimpaired if the prices paid by state-A buyers rise
to reflect the destination tax.
For a 20% destination tax, for example, incentives are
unimpaired if the prices paid by state-A buyers to both states’ sellers
rise by 25% and the prices paid by state-B buyers remain unchanged,
as shown in Table 1 (under the assumption that all prices would be
$100 in the absence of taxes).

76

See DAVID F. BRADFORD, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: GOING
GLOBAL WITH A SIMPLE, PROGRESSIVE TAX 5 (2004); HARRY GRUBERT & T.
SCOTT NEWLON, TAXING CONSUMPTION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 8 (1997).
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TABLE 1: STATE A IMPOSES TWENTY PERCENT
DESTINATION TAX
State-A Seller
State-B Seller
Buyer pays 125
Buyer pays 125
State-A Buyer
Tax 25
Tax 25
Seller
receives
Seller
receives
100
100
Buyer pays 100
Buyer pays 100
State-B Buyer
No tax
No Tax
Seller
receives
Seller
receives
100
100

State-A buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B sellers
to state-A sellers because they face the same 25% price increase
either way. State-B buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B
sellers to state-A sellers because they pay unchanged prices either
way. State-A sellers have no incentive to switch from state-B buyers
to state-A buyers because they receive an unchanged after-tax
amount either way. State-B sellers have no incentive to switch from
state-A buyers to state-B buyers because they receive an unchanged
after-tax amount either way.
Now, suppose that state A imposes a uniform tax on all sales by
state-A sellers, both their intrastate sales to state-A buyers and their
interstate sales to state-B buyers. Such a tax, which is imposed on
products sold from the taxing jurisdiction (and are therefore
imposed on exports, but not imports), is called an origin tax. Then,
tBA = tAA and tAB is zero and condition (1) is satisfied. Incentives to
engage in interstate transactions are unimpaired if all prices remain
unchanged. Table 2 depicts this outcome for a 20% origin tax.
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TABLE 2: STATE A IMPOSES TWENTY PERCENT
ORIGIN TAX
State-A Seller
State-B Seller
Buyer pays 100
Buyer pays 100
State-A Buyer
Tax 20
No tax
Seller receives 80
Seller
receives
100
Buyer pays 100
Buyer pays 100
State-B Buyer
Tax 20
No tax
Seller receives 80
Seller
receives
100
State-A buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B sellers
to state-A sellers because they pay unchanged prices either way.
State-B buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B sellers to
state-A sellers because they pay unchanged prices either way. StateA sellers have no incentive to switch from state-B buyers to state-A
buyers because they suffer a 20% reduction in after-tax receipts
either way. State-B sellers have no incentive to switch from state-A
buyers to state-B buyers because they receive unchanged after-tax
amounts either way.
A combination of destination and origin taxes is also commerce
neutral. Suppose that state A imposes both a 20% destination tax on
all purchases by state-A buyers and a 10% origin tax on all sales by
state-A sellers. For each tax to be neutral (so that their combination
is neutral), however, intrastate transactions must be subject to both
taxes, as each intrastate transaction involves both an in-state buyer
and an in-state seller. That requires a 28% tax rate on intrastate
transactions. After the destination tax takes 20% of the buyer’s total
payment, the origin tax takes 10% of the remaining 80%, or another
8% of the total payment. Because tBA is .2, tAB is .1, and tAA is 0.28,
condition (1) is satisfied. The interaction term, -tBAtAB, in condition
(1) reflects the fact that the origin tax is imposed only on the amount
remaining after the destination tax is paid.77
77

As Mason and Knoll observe, the first tax must be deductible in computing
the second tax, as it would be if it had been imposed by the other state. See Mason
& Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55; see also supra text accompanying
note 55.
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Incentives to engage in interstate transactions are unimpaired if
the prices paid by state-A buyers to both states’ sellers rise 25%, as
shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3: STATE A IMPOSES TWENTY PERCENT
DESTINATION TAX AND TEN PERCENT ORIGIN TAX
(TWENTY-EIGHT PERCENT TAX ON INTRASTATE
TRANSACTIONS)
State-A Seller
State-B Seller
Buyer pays 125
Buyer pays 125
State-A Buyer
Tax 35
Tax 25
Seller receives 90
Seller
receives
100
Buyer pays 100
Buyer pays 100
State-B Buyer
Tax 10
No tax
Seller receives 90
Seller
receives
100
State-A buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B sellers
to state-A sellers because they face a 25% price increase either way.
State-B buyers have no incentive to switch from state-A sellers to
state-B sellers because they pay unchanged prices either way. StateA sellers have no incentive to switch from state-B buyers to state-A
buyers because they suffer a 10% reduction in after-tax receipts
either way. State-B sellers have no incentive to switch from state-A
buyers to state-B buyers because they receive unchanged after-tax
amounts either way.
Subjecting intrastate transactions to both the origin tax and the
destination tax is required for neutrality. The intrastate transactions
compete with outbound transactions on the sale side and with
inbound transactions on the purchase side; to avoid giving parties an
incentive to switch to the intrastate transactions, the intrastate
transactions must bear both of the taxes that apply to the competing
interstate transactions. Another way to see the point is to recognize
that the origin tax is neutral only if it is imposed on the intrastate
transactions and that the destination tax is neutral only if it is
imposed on the intrastate transactions; neutrality therefore requires
that both taxes be imposed on the intrastate transactions.
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D. Irrelevance of Multiple Taxation
The prevention of discrimination against interstate commerce,
which is the proper concern of the DCC, differs from the prevention
of multiple taxation, which occurs when an interstate transaction is
taxed by two or more states. The Supreme Court has often indicated
that one of the purposes of the DCC is to prevent multiple taxation78
and has often conflated the concepts of discrimination and multiple
taxation. But either multiple taxation or discrimination against
interstate commerce can occur with or without the other.
Commerce Neutrality demonstrates that the prevention of
multiple taxation is not a valid economic or constitutional concern.
Suppose that state A imposes a 20% destination tax and state B
imposes a 10% origin tax. Then, sales from state A to state B are
double taxed and face a combined tax rate of 28% (a 20%
destination tax in state A and a 10% origin tax on the remaining 80%
in state B). On the other hand, sales from state B to state A are not
taxed by either state. Despite the double taxation, interstate
commerce receives neutral treatment, because each state’s tax
system is neutral. That conclusion can be confirmed by noting that
nobody has an incentive to switch away from interstate transactions
if state-A buyers pay 25% more for all of their purchases and stateB buyers pay unchanged prices for all of their purchases, as shown
in Table 4.

78

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979) (“It
is a commonplace of constitutional jurisprudence that multiple taxation may well
be offensive to the Commerce Clause.”).
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TABLE 4: STATE A IMPOSES TWENTY PERCENT
DESTINATION TAX,
STATE B IMPOSES TEN PERCENT ORIGIN TAX
State-A Seller
State-B Seller
Buyer pays 125
Buyer pays 125
State-A Buyer
Tax 25 (A)
Tax 35 (25 A, 10 B)
Seller receives 100 Seller receives 90
Buyer pays 100
Buyer pays 100
State-B Buyer
No Tax
Tax 10 (B)
Seller receives 100 Seller receives 90

State-A buyers have no incentive to switch from state-B sellers
to state-A sellers because they face a 25% price increase either way.
State-B buyers have no incentive to switch from state-A sellers to
state-B sellers because they pay unchanged prices either way. StateA sellers have no incentive to switch from state-B buyers to state-A
buyers because they receive unchanged after-tax receipts either way.
State-B sellers have no incentive to switch from state-A buyers to
state-B buyers because they face a 10% reduction in after-tax
receipts either way.
It may seem surprising that incentives for B-to-A sales can be
maintained in the face of double taxation. But, the relevant question
is how the tax burden on a transaction compares to the tax burden
on alternative transactions. Each of the two tax burdens on B-to-A
sales is matched by a corresponding tax on competing transactions.
B-to-A sales face a 10% origin tax, but so do intrastate sales in state
B; B-to-A sales also face a 20% destination tax, but so do intrastate
purchases in state A.
Because each state’s tax system is nondiscriminatory, it has no
obligation to accommodate the other state’s taxes. For example,
neither state is required to grant a credit for taxes paid to the other
state. Moreover, there is no need for the states to harmonize their tax
rates or their choice between origin and destination bases. The
independence of state tax systems is reassuring because there would
be no convincing logical way to determine which state would have
the obligation to accommodate, or harmonize with, the other.79 In
79

But see Walter Hellerstein, Deciphering the Court’s Opinion in Wynne,
123 J. TAX’N 4, 6–9 (2015) [hereinafter Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne]
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short, the neutrality of each state’s system is undisturbed by the
existence of the other.80
The Supreme Court has sometimes recognized this principle,
stating that double taxation resulting from differences in states’ tax
rules “is not a structural evil that flows from either tax individually,
but it is rather the accidental incident of interstate commerce being
subjected to two different taxing jurisdictions.”81 Unfortunately, in
other cases, the Court has suggested that multiple taxation may
violate the DCC.82 This uncertainty about when multiple taxation
matters, and when it does not, disappears under Commerce
Neutrality, which reveals that multiple taxation is never the relevant
concern; the only thing that matters is whether each state’s tax
system is nondiscriminatory.
E. Accounting for Economic Effects of Price Changes
Before further discussing the relationship of the Commerce
Neutrality analysis to the Court’s DCC jurisprudence, we address a
potential concern about the analysis. Even if the state taxes satisfy
conditions (1) and (2), there is no guarantee that the price changes
caused by the tax will equal the price changes that preserve each
group’s incentives to engage in interstate commerce. This
uncertainty about the actual price changes may seem problematic,
as courts cannot reliably determine the impact of a tax system on
prices. Comparing prices before the tax took effect to those after it
(arguing for constitutional rule giving priority to source state over residence state
in income taxation).
80
Cf. Ruth Mason, Made in America for European Tax: The Internal
Consistency Test, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1277, 1307 (2008) (observing, in international
context, that each country’s tax system should be judged on its own merits).
81
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 192 (1995).
82
We will discuss multiple taxation further in Parts IV and VII, including
the Court’s de-emphasis of that concern in Wynne. See, e.g., MeadWestvaco Corp.
v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24 (2008) (stating that DCC forbids taxes
“subjecting [interstate] activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned taxation”);
Exxon Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue of Wis., 447 U.S. 207, 228–29 (1980) (rejecting
DCC challenge partly because “actual multiple taxation has not been shown”);
Japan Line, Ltd., 441 U.S. at 446 (noting “commonplace of constitutional
jurisprudence that multiple taxation may well be offensive to the Commerce
Clause”).
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took effect would not resolve the question because other factors may
have changed around the time the tax took effect. Any effort to
isolate the effects of the taxes would be complicated and
inconclusive.
Fortunately, courts generally need not undertake that task, as
they can uphold a tax system if its tax rates satisfy condition (1) and
invalidate it if its tax rates violate condition (1), without
investigating any price changes induced by the tax system.83 That
conclusion is clear if a state imposes a tax system that violates the
condition. Then, at every mathematically possible set of price
changes, at least one group’s incentive to engage in interstate
commerce must be impaired. There is no need for courts to identify
the actual price changes; regardless of what they might be, it is
logically inescapable that someone’s incentives to engage in
interstate commerce have been impaired. In nearly all cases, the
system should then be invalidated. However, some policies that
slightly deviate from the neutrality condition (1) should be upheld if
the administrative costs of adopting a fully neutral alternative would
be unduly large.84
Things may seem less clear if the tax system satisfies condition
(1). Although possible price changes preserving each group’s
incentives to engage in interstate commerce exist, the actual price
changes may not do so. Nevertheless, the tax system should
generally be upheld because it does not systematically discourage
interstate transactions. Suppose, for example, that state A imposes
the 20% destination tax described in Table 1, but that the taxinclusive prices paid by state-A buyers do not rise by the full 25%
set forth in the table. State-B sellers then have a lower net payoff
from selling to state-A buyers, impairing their incentive to engage
in interstate commerce. But, state-A sellers also have a lower net

83

Cf. Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1101–02.
See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496
U.S. 18, 40 n.23 (1990) (“[A] tax scheme would not violate the Commerce Clause
merely because tax collectors inadvertently missed a few in-state taxpayers.”);
Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (upholding fixed fee on
trucking on administrative-cost grounds). This principle is discussed in further
detail in Section VI.B in connection with nonrefundable tax credits and Section
VII.B in connection with flat fees.
84
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payoff from selling to state-A buyers, increasing their incentives to
engage in interstate commerce by switching to state-B buyers.
So long as the tax system satisfies condition (1), any price
changes that impair one group’s incentive to engage in interstate
commerce must improve another group’s incentive to do so. On net,
the tax system may incidentally change the volume of interstate
transactions in one direction or the other. But, there is no need for a
complicated inquiry to identify those effects. It is generally
sufficient to note that the tax system does not systematically impede
interstate commerce.85
III. COMMERCE NEUTRALITY AND THE DCC
Although Commerce Neutrality may initially appear to be a
marked departure from DCC jurisprudence and principles, that is not
so. Commerce Neutrality is identical to the Court’s internal
consistency test under most circumstances. Moreover, it has a
grounding in constitutional text and history, which few other
purported DCC principles can claim.
A. Internal Consistency and Commerce Neutrality
The Court first mentioned internal consistency in Container
Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board.86 Under the
Court’s common description of the internal consistency test, state
A’s tax system is valid if interstate transactions would be subject to
the same total nationwide tax burden as intrastate transactions under
the assumption that every state adopted that tax system.87
Unfortunately, this description makes the internal consistency test
85

See infra Section V.B. However, some taxes that facially satisfy (1) should
be struck down because they constitute de facto discrimination against interstate
commerce. As we explain, some consideration of the taxes’ effects is then
necessary, but the relevant judgment calls can generally be made without
complicated economic inquiries. Id.
86
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169 (1983).
87
See, e.g., Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185 (“This test . . . looks to the
structure of the tax at issue to see whether its identical application by every State
in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disadvantage as compared with
commerce intrastate.”).
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look like an abstraction disconnected from economic reality, as it
appears to consider the hypothetical scenario in which other states
copy the single state’s tax rather than the actual tax systems
employed by the other states. Indeed, critics, such as Justice Scalia,
have attacked the test on this ground.88 A related criticism has noted
that the test cannot determine whether any interstate transactions
actually face multiple taxation.89 But, as we discussed in section
II.D, multiple taxation is not the relevant DCC issue.
The attacks on the internal consistency test’s relation to
economic reality are wrong. Internal consistency, in most
instances,90 is equivalent to Commerce Neutrality and therefore
accurately measures a tax system’s discriminatory effect. Each
interstate transaction is an outbound transaction in one state and an
inbound transaction in another state. If every state adopted state A’s
tax system, each interstate transaction would pay in one state the tax
that state A imposes on outbound transactions and would also pay
in another state the tax that state A imposes on inbound transactions.
Each intrastate transaction would face a tax in its state equal to the
tax that state A imposes on intrastate transactions. When the test
compares those hypothetical nationwide tax burdens, it is also
comparing the combined tax that state A actually imposes on
inbound and outbound transactions to the tax that state A actually
imposes on intrastate transactions, which is precisely the
comparison made by the tax-rate condition (1). There is nothing
hypothetical about that comparison.
When a state adopts an internally consistent tax system, for
which the combined tax on inbound and outbound transactions
matches the tax on intrastate transactions, the system is commerce
neutral, regardless of what other states may do. The fact that
intrastate and interstate transactions would bear equal nationwide
88

See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1809 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (regarding the internal consistency rule to be an
“exercise in counterfactuals” that “nicely showcases our ad hocery”).
89
See, e.g., SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION, supra note 5, at 54; Walter
Hellerstein, Is ‘Internal Consistency’ Foolish? Reflections on an Emerging
Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138, 165 (1988)
[hereinafter Hellerstein, Internal Consistency].
90
We discuss below the exception to this statement, which arises when a
state makes its taxes dependent on other states’ taxes.
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tax burdens if every state copied the tax system is a side effect of,
rather than the reason for, the system’s neutrality; the fact that such
a system actually is neutral when adopted by any single state
explains why it would remain neutral if, hypothetically, it were to
be adopted by every state.
The internal consistency test has worked well when the Court
has used it because it largely replicates Commerce Neutrality’s taxrate condition. However, the Court has failed to articulate the test’s
underlying rationale. In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, West Virginia
imposed gross receipts taxes of 0.88% on companies that
manufactured property within the state and 0.27% on companies that
wholesaled tangible property within the state, but exempted
companies that both manufactured and wholesaled within the state
from the wholesaling tax.91 The West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals concluded that the tax system did not discriminate against
interstate commerce because the 0.88% tax on intrastate transactions
(in which both manufacturing and wholesaling occurred within the
state) was higher than the 0.27% tax on inbound transactions (in
which property manufactured elsewhere was wholesaled within the
state).92 The U.S. Supreme Court struck down West Virginia’s tax
under the internal consistency test, noting that, if every state copied
it, interstate transactions would pay approximately 1.15%
nationwide tax while intrastate transactions would pay 0.88%
nationwide tax.93 The Court rightly rejected West Virginia’s
objection that other states had not actually copied its tax structure,94
but did not state its reasons clearly. It noted that other states had
“every right” to impose manufacturing taxes even if they had not
done so95 and it refused to make the constitutionality of a state’s tax
law “depend on the shifting complexities of the tax codes of 49 other
States.”96 The Court should have said that, because the internal
91

Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 640 (1984) (citing W. VA. CODE § 1113-2c (1983)).
92
Id. at 641 (citing Armco v. Hardesty, 303 S.E. 2d 706 (1983)).
93
Id. at 642. In 1987, the Court reaffirmed Armco. Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Dep’t
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987) (striking down Washington’s similar tax
system).
94
Armco, 467 U.S. at 644.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 644–45.
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consistency test revealed that West Virginia’s combined treatment
of inbound and outbound transactions was less favorable than the
treatment of intrastate transactions, its tax system was
discriminatory, regardless of what other states might do. Similarly,
in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, the Court used the
internal consistency test, but lamented that the test “asks nothing
about the economic reality reflected by the tax.”97
In one widely debated DCC case, the Court could have made its
reasoning much clearer if it had relied on the internal consistency
test, which it did not mention. In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc.
v. Town of Harrison, the Court struck down a Maine property tax
exemption for in-state summer camps that served state residents.98
Under that exemption, Maine imposed a property tax only on
outbound transactions (in-state camps serving nonresidents), with
no tax on inbound transactions (out-of-state camps serving
residents) or intrastate transactions (in-state camps serving
residents), effectively imposing an export tariff.99 The exemption
violated the internal consistency test; if every state copied it, a camp
in one state that served residents of another state would be taxed in
its home state while a camp that served residents of its own state
would not be taxed.100 Explaining that point would have enabled the
Court to respond to the dissent’s claim that the exemption did not
involve facial discrimination against interstate commerce or
economic protectionism.101
The internal consistency test also exposes the fallacy in the
argument that intrastate and inbound transactions should always be
taxed at the same rate, to avoid giving out-of-state sellers a tax
advantage over in-state sellers. That policy is neutral if there is no
tax on outbound transactions but is discriminatory if outbound
transactions are taxed. Because the tax-rate condition (1) calls for
97

Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 185 (1995).
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
579–80, 595 (1995).
99
Id. at 580–81.
100
The tax benefit would have been internally consistent if it had applied to
all camps, no matter where located, that served state residents, an option to which
the Court alluded, or if it had applied to all in-state camps, no matter who they
served. Id. at 582 n.16.
101
Id. at 602–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98
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intrastate transactions to pay the same tax as the combined tax on
inbound and outbound transactions, intrastate transactions must be
taxed more heavily than inbound transactions if outbound
transactions are taxed. Inbound transactions cannot be taxed to
compensate for their exemption from the origin-based taxes that
intrastate transactions face; the origin-based taxes are already
neutral because they apply to outbound transactions on the same
terms as inbound transactions. The Court has rightly rejected efforts
to justify import taxes as compensation for origin-based taxes, but
has not always been clear about its reasons.102
Internal consistency and Commerce Neutrality diverge if the
state makes its tax rate dependent on other states’ tax policies. Then,
it matters whether we look at the actual tax systems used by other
states or the hypothetical policies assumed by the internal
consistency test. Although it is still only the state’s own taxes that
matter for the validity of its system, those taxes now depend on what
other states are doing and information about other states’ actual
taxes is therefore needed to accurately describe the state’s own
system. The most important example of interdependent state tax
systems is the provision of credits for taxes paid to other states,
which we will discuss in section IV.B.
Ruth Mason notes the problems that the internal consistency test
faces in the presence of reciprocity provisions, another example of
interdependence.103 Suppose that state A will impose a
nondiscriminatory tax system if state B does the same, but will also
impose a discriminatory tax system if state B does so. The internal
consistency test yields indeterminate results. One could assume that
both states impose the nondiscriminatory tax and uphold state A’s
tax system or one could assume that both states impose the
102

See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1996)
(rejecting North Carolina’s attempt to justify a higher tax on residents’ holdings
of stocks in companies that operated out of state by pointing to corporate income
taxes paid by companies operating in state and noting that state had no right to
impose corporate income tax on companies that operated out of state); Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100, 104–05 (1994) (concluding
that tax on imported waste was not properly calibrated to match income taxes
imposed on intrastate waste production and suggesting that imported waste
probably faced tax in other states).
103
Mason, supra note 80, at 1323–25.
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discriminatory tax and strike down state A’s tax system. Such
provisions should be invalidated because states should not be
allowed to respond to other states’ DCC violations by committing
their own violations rather than pursuing judicial remedies. In New
Energy v. Limbach, the Court held that a reciprocity provision does
not save a measure that otherwise violates the DCC.104
Except for these cases of interdependent state policies, however,
the Court’s internal consistency test is functionally identical to
Commerce Neutrality. Therefore, Commerce Neutrality has a basis
in the Court’s current DCC analysis.
B. The Legal Case for Commerce Neutrality
Aside from its close connection to the internal consistency test,
Commerce Neutrality also has a grounding in the history and
purposes of the DCC and the constitutional text that other principles
lack. Many respected voices have debated the DCC’s constitutional
and historical validity.105 Our contention concerning Commerce
Neutrality’s validity, however, is much more modest. Assuming that
the DCC continues as a constitutional restraint on state power—
which appears to be the case—we believe that Commerce Neutrality
is the appropriate framework because it aligns with both the text of
the Commerce Clause and the DCC’s historical objective.
The DCC is justified as an implication of the Commerce
Clause’s affirmative empowerment of Congress to regulate
“commerce among the several states.” Yet, many models deviate
from an analysis of a challenged policy’s actual effect on interstate
commerce. This nontextual focus has produced a number of
confused strands of DCC jurisprudence, such as the out-of-staterequality principle. In contrast, Commerce Neutrality focuses on the
Commerce Clause’s textual concern—transactions of trade.106 In
104

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 275–76. This stance
is consistent with the Court’s DCC decisions striking down reciprocity provisions
in state regulations. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Neb. ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
957–58 (1982); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976).
105
See Friedman & Deacon, supra note 7, at 1878–79 & n.6 (presenting
voluminous description of DCC criticism).
106
See THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 552 (Clarendon Press 2d ed.
1989) (defining “commerce” as the “exchange between men of the products of
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that respect, Commerce Neutrality puts the “commerce” back in the
DCC.
Some have criticized the DCC on the grounds that it entrenches
a particular economic philosophy, the economic case for free trade,
into the Constitution, arguing that this vision is much like the now
discredited jurisprudence flowing from Lochner v. New York.107 But
that comparison is inapt. The Lochner jurisprudence protected
economic rights from Congress, as well as from state legislatures.108
As noted in Part I, however, the DCC is merely a presumptive
restriction on state authority, which Congress is free to override.109
A commerce-neutral DCC requires that any decision to deviate from
free trade be made, or authorized, by Congress rather than by states
with potentially parochial motivations.
Commerce
Neutrality’s
implementation
of
the
nondiscrimination principle also aligns with the DCC’s historical
purposes. One of the most common justifications for the DCC is the
“critical period” thesis popularized by historian John Fiske in
1888.110 Fiske asserts that the constitutional framers were motivated
to create a new governing regime primarily because of escalating
disputes among the states over discriminatory trade policies.111
Although many have criticized the historical validity of Fiske’s
nature or art; buying and selling together; trading; exchange of merchandise”);
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 101 (2001) (demonstrating that the original meaning of commerce
referenced the “trade or exchange of goods”).
107
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); cf. Paul E. McGreal, The
Flawed Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1191, 1234–36 (1998) (explaining that the demise of Lochner should prompt the
Court to relax some DCC restrictions on state regulation).
108
See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (invalidating a
federal law that prohibited “yellow dog” contracts in which employees agreed not
to join labor unions).
109
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423 (1946)
(upholding federally authorized state tax on out-of-state insurance companies).
110
See Brandon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against
Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37, 39–43 (2005) [hereinafter Denning, ConfederationEra].
111
See JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY
(Houghton Mifflin 1888).
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thesis, modern scholarship supports the proposition that state
discrimination against interstate trade was real and likely a concern
of the framers.112
Despite these questions concerning the historical validity of
Fiske’s thesis, it cannot be disputed that the Court has cited the
concerns underlying Fiske’s thesis as a justification for the DCC for
generations. In the nineteenth century, the Court invalidated
numerous discriminatory state laws that would have promoted
political and economic Balkanization based on the Commerce
Clause’s historical objective.113 Reliance on this historical thesis
extended past the New Deal revolution, with the Court striking
down discriminatory measures on the basis that the American
system, “fostered by the Commerce Clause,” guaranteed, among
other things, freedom from duties and embargoes of other states and
“free access to every market in the Nation.”114 Modern decisions,
including the recent decision in Wynne, have also cited these
concerns as a justification for the DCC and its prohibition against

112

See generally Denning, Confederation-Era, supra note 110, at 40–43
(rehabilitating historical basis of Fiske’s “Critical Period”).
113
Cushman, supra note 32, at 1101 (“As the national economy became
increasingly integrated in the years following the Civil War, the Court began a
conscious and increasingly aggressive campaign to break down local barriers to
interstate trade through a ‘free-trade’ construction of the dormant Commerce
Clause.”); see also Bowman v. Chi. & Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 494 (1888) (“In view
of the commercial anarchy and confusion that would result from the diverse
exertions of power by the several states of the union, it cannot be supposed that
the Constitution or Congress have intended to limit the freedom of commercial
intercourse among the people of the several States.”); Robbins v. Shelby County
Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 498 (1887) (striking down protectionist statute that
would bring the country “back to the condition of things which existed before the
adoption of the [C]onstitution, and which was one of the principal causes that led
to it”); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 574 (1878) (striking down a
discriminatory tax and explaining that the Constitutional framers designed the
Commerce Clause as a protection “against the dangers of any taxation by the
States which would interfere with the freest interchange of commodities among
the people of the different States” (emphasis added)).
114
H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949); see also
Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525 (1935) (refusing to uphold a
law that “would neutralize the economic consequences of free trade among the
states,” based on the Commerce Clause’s purpose).
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discriminatory state policies.115 Thus, by striking down
discriminatory policies that would lead to economic and political
Balkanization, Commerce Neutrality is firmly aligned with the legal
foundations of the Court’s DCC jurisprudence.116
IV. COMPTROLLER OF THE TREASURY OF MARYLAND V. WYNNE AND
COMMERCE-NEUTRAL PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION
In Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne the
Supreme Court invalidated Maryland’s income tax scheme because
it discriminated against interstate commerce.117 Importantly, the
Court relied on the internal consistency test, noting that the test’s
conclusion was consistent with the undisputed economic analysis,
which showed that Maryland’s tax scheme operated as a tariff.118 As

115
Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1794
(noting that the Commerce Clause “reflected a central concern of the Framers that
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional convention: the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward
economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation”); see also, e.g., Okla. Tax
Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 180; C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (noting that nondiscrimination requirement
is designed “to prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures
the Constitution was designed to prevent”).
116
Multiple commentators have argued that the proper—and only valid—
justification for the DCC is the preservation of political unity, not
antidiscrimination for economic efficiency’s sake. See Mehmet K. KonarSteenberg, One Nation or One Market? Liberals, Conservatives, and the
Misunderstanding of H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 11 PENN. J. CON. L. 960–64
(2009); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1112–16
(1986); Denning, Reconstructing the DCC Doctrine, supra note 35. That
distinction, however, is inapplicable to Commerce Neutrality. Commerce
Neutrality invalidates taxes and subsidies that favor intrastate commerce over
interstate commerce. Although eliminating such policies promotes economic
efficiency, there is no reason to believe that it will not also reduce the political
friction that naturally accompanies protectionist policies.
117
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.
118
Id. at 1804.
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explained below, that economic analysis bears much similarity to
Commerce Neutrality.
A. Commerce-Neutral Personal Income Taxation
The application of Commerce Neutrality to individual income
taxation is straightforward, as outlined in the Tax Economists Brief
and the Knoll-Mason Brief filed in Wynne and relied upon by the
Wynne majority.119 In this context, the tax-rate condition (1) requires
that the tax rate on nonresidents’ in-state income plus the tax rate on
residents’ out-of-state income (minus the interaction term) must be
less than or equal to the tax rate on residents’ in-state income.
This condition is satisfied by a uniform residence tax that applies
to all income earned by residents, both within and outside the state,
while exempting nonresidents’ incomes. It is also satisfied by a
uniform source tax that applies to all income earned within the state,
both by residents and nonresidents, while exempting residents’ outof-state incomes. Moreover, it is met by a combination of the two
taxes.120 This is the same condition that emerges from Mason and
Knoll’s competitive neutrality analysis.121
For residence and source taxes and combinations thereof, wage
changes exist that preserve everyone’s incentive to earn income
across state lines.
First, consider a 5% residence tax in state A. Incentives are
preserved if before-tax wages in both states remain unchanged.
State-B residents, who are not subject to the tax, have no incentive
119

See Tax Economists Brief, supra note 12; see also Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at
1804; Knoll & Mason Brief, supra note 57; Alan D. Viard, The Real Issue in
Wynne is Discrimination, Not Double Taxation, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 45 (2015);
Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, Wynne: It’s Not About Double Taxation, 75 ST.
TAX NOTES 413 (2015). For discussion of the Tax Economists Brief, see James
W. Wetzler, The Economists’ Amicus Brief in Wynne, 75 ST. TAX NOTES 41
(2015).
120
The Court has upheld states’ power to tax residents on all of their income,
including out-of-state income. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S.
450, 463 (1995); New York ex rel. Cohn v. Groves, 300 U.S. 308, 313–14 (1937).
The Court has also upheld states’ power to tax in-state income, including that
earned by nonresidents. Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 50–52 (1920); Travis v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75–76 (1920).
121
Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1073.
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to switch from state-A work to state-B work. State-A residents have
no incentive to switch from state-B work to state-A work, as they
pay the 5% tax either way.
Next, consider a 5% source tax in state A. Incentives are
preserved if before-tax wages for residents of both states rise by
5.26% in state A and remain unchanged in state B. State-B residents
have no incentive to switch from state-A work to state-B work. If
they work in state A, their wages rise 5.26% and they pay the 5%
source-based tax to state A, which offsets the wage increase.122 If
they work at home in state B, they have no wage change and pay no
tax. State-A residents have no incentive to switch from state-B work
to state-A work, because they face the same wages and taxes as
state-B residents.
Now, suppose that state A imposes both a 5% uniform tax on all
income earned by its residents, whether within or outside the state,
and a 5% uniform tax on all income earned within the state, whether
by residents or nonresidents. Recall from our analysis in section II.C
that each of the two taxes is uniform only if residents’ in-state
income is fully subject to both taxes. The residence tax is neutral
only if it applies to residents’ in-state income on the same terms as
their out-of-state income and the source tax is neutral only if it
applies to residents’ in-state income on the same terms as
nonresidents’ in-state income. Residents’ in-state income must face
a 9.75% tax rate, as required by (1), with the source tax taking 5%
of the income and the residence tax taking 5% of the remaining 95%.
With 5% tax on residents’ out-of-state income, 5% tax on
nonresidents’ in-state income, and 9.75% tax on residents’ in-state
income, incentives are preserved if wages rise 5.26% in state A and
remain unchanged in state B. State-B residents have no incentive to
switch from state-A work to state-B work. If they work in state A,
their wages rise 5.26% and they pay 5% tax to state A; if they work
at home in state B, they face no tax or wage changes. State-A
residents have no incentive to switch from state-B work to state-A
work. If they work in state B, they receive their original wages and
pay 5% tax, leaving them with a 5% shortfall; if they work at home

122

An increase in wages from $10,000 to $10,526 offsets the $526 tax (5%
of $10,526).
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in state A, their wages rise 5.26% and they pay 9.75% tax, also
leaving them with a 5% shortfall.123
To return to a concern that we addressed in section II.C, it may
seem odd that the permissible tax rate on residents’ out-of-state
income falls when the tax rate on nonresidents’ in-state income rises
(holding constant the tax rate on residents’ in-state income). But,
that relationship reflects the interdependence of economic
incentives. When a state imposes a higher tax rate on nonresidents’
in-state income, wages must rise within the state to avoid creating
an incentive for nonresidents to shift to work in their home state.
But, the higher in-state wage threatens to create an incentive for
residents to switch to working at home, which must be averted by
reducing the tax rate on their out-of-state income.
The analysis reveals that it is discriminatory to tax both
nonresidents’ in-state income and residents’ out-of-state income at
5% while taxing residents’ in-state income at only 5%. That system
is equivalent to a neutral 5% residence-based tax plus a 5%
discriminatory tariff on nonresidents’ in-state income. It is also
equivalent to a neutral 5% source-based tax plus a 5%
discriminatory tariff on residents’ out-of-state income.
Nevertheless, most states with an individual income tax impose
tax on both residents’ out-of-state income and nonresidents’ in-state
income.124 When the combined tax burden on these types of income
exceeds the tax burden on residents’ in-state income, the tax system
discriminates against interstate income.
B. A Flawed Solution: Credits for Taxes Paid to Other
States
States generally provide one form of relief from this
discrimination. Every state with a broad-based income tax allows its
residents a credit for income taxes paid to other states in which the

123

If wages rise from $10,000 to $10,526, the tax is $1,026 (9.75% of
$10,526) and after-tax income is $9,500.
124
See WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 397 (West 9th ed. 2009) (“[S]tates generally tax residents on
their income from all sources while taxing nonresidents on income from sources
within the state.”).
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residents earned income.125 Most states provide a “full” credit,
meaning that the other state’s tax is credited up to the full amount of
tax that the residence state imposes on the out-of-state income.126
There is no credit for the portion, if any, of the other state’s tax that
exceeds the tax imposed by the residence state.127
So, if the home-state tax rate is 5% and the income is taxed in
the source state at a rate higher than 5%, the credit wipes out the
residence state tax. For that taxpayer, Commerce Neutrality has
been achieved, because the credit effectively exempts the out-ofstate income from tax. However, if the other state taxes the income
at less than 5%, the full credit does not completely exempt the
income from tax at home. If the other state imposes a 3% rate, for
example, the resident still pays 2% tax at home after claiming the
credit. That residual tax violates neutrality. So long as the state taxes
residents’ and nonresidents’ in-state incomes at the same rate,
Commerce Neutrality forbids any tax on residents’ out-of-state
income.128
Although a full credit does not satisfy Commerce Neutrality, it
satisfies internal consistency. The equivalence between internal
consistency and Commerce Neutrality breaks down when a state
makes its taxes dependent on other states’ taxes, as is true when a
credit is provided for taxes paid to other states.129 The internal
consistency test examines the nationwide burdens that would arise
if every state copied the challenged state’s tax system. Under that
assumption, the state in which the income is earned would tax the
income at the same rate as the residence state and the full credit
would wipe out the residence state’s tax. The assumption
125

Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 5 n.5.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1060–64. Mason
and Knoll observe that neutrality is achieved if all states provide credits that are
not limited to the amount of tax owed at home. If all states provide unlimited
credits, a state income tax system that taxed residents’ in-state and out-of-state
incomes at the same rate is neutral, no matter how heavily nonresidents’ in-state
income was taxed because the tax paid by nonresidents is fully reimbursed by
their home states. Note that the neutrality of each state’s tax system depends upon
other states’ provision of an unlimited credit, not the state’s own provision of such
a credit. Of course, no state has adopted, or is likely to adopt, an unlimited credit.
129
See supra Section III.A.
126
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automatically rules out the case in which the credit falls short of
neutrality, when the source state imposes a lower tax rate.
The full credit’s perceived virtue is that it eliminates multiple
taxation. But, that focus is misplaced. When one or both of the
states’ tax systems are discriminatory, removing multiple taxation
generally does not eliminate discrimination. Conversely, when both
states’ tax systems are neutral, there is no need to eliminate multiple
taxation.130 For example, Commerce Neutrality is satisfied if state
A imposes a 5% source tax and state B imposes a 5% residence tax,
even though income earned by B-residents in state A is double taxed
(and income earned by A-residents in state B goes untaxed).
Everyone’s incentives to earn income across state lines are
preserved if wages rise by 5.26% in state A and remain unchanged
in state B.131 Because each state’s system is neutral, neither state
need provide a credit for taxes paid to the other state. Credits are
therefore unnecessary if both states’ taxes are neutral. They are also
insufficient if either state’s tax system is discriminatory.
Nevertheless, credits are the longstanding remedy for states’
discriminatory personal income tax systems.132
Before Wynne, the disputed issue was not whether credits are
constitutionally sufficient to rehabilitate discriminatory income tax
systems,133 but whether discriminatory income tax systems are
constitutional even in the absence of credits.134 But, in Wynne, the
130

See supra Section II.D.
A-residents have no incentive to switch from state-B work to state-A
work. If they work at home in state A, they receive a 5.26% wage increase that
offsets their 5% tax; if they work in state B, they receive an unchanged tax-free
wage. B-residents have no incentive to switch from state-A work to state-B work.
If they work at home in state B, they receive an unchanged wage and pay a 5%
tax; if they work in state A, they receive a 5.26% wage increase, pay a combined
tax of 9.75% to the two states, and suffer a 5% net loss.
132
See generally Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 5
n.5 (discussing how “virtually all income tax crediting regimes operate”).
133
In Tyler Pipe Industries, the Court suggested that Washington could
correct the internal inconsistency of its manufacturing and wholesale taxes by
providing credit for other states’ taxes. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t
of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249 (1987). The Washington legislature then did so.
See Hellerstein, Internal Consistency, supra note 89, at 144 n.33.
134
See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND
LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 942–43 (Thomson/West, 8th ed.
131
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Supreme Court changed the landscape by shifting the focus away
from multiple taxation and toward discrimination.135
C. Wynne: A Step in the Right Direction
In 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated Maryland’s state income
tax system under the internal consistency test.136 Maryland’s state
income tax, which applied to residents’ in-state and out-of-state
income and nonresidents’ in-state income, had a top rate of 4.75%
in 2006, the tax year at issue in Wynne.137 The state also collected a
county income tax, with rates varying across counties in a range of
1.25 to 3.2%, which applied to residents’ in-state and out-of-state
income.138 Nonresidents’ in-state income was subjected to statecollected county tax at a flat 1.25% rate.139 Residents received a
credit for taxes paid to other states on out-of-state income, but the
credit was limited to the state income tax liability imposed on the
out-of-state income; the credit could not be claimed against the
state-collected county income tax.140
In invalidating this system, the Court noted that neither
Maryland nor the principal dissent questioned the internal
consistency test’s “economic bona fides.”141 In explaining its use of
the test, the Court suggested, with varying degrees of clarity, that
the Maryland tax system’s flaw was discrimination against interstate
commerce rather than the multiple taxation that the respondents
2005) (noting that the due process clause does not require credits or other
measures to relieve double taxation and discussing uncertainty about whether the
DCC requires such measures). In 2014, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
upheld against a DCC challenge a tax on gambling winnings that applied to
nonresidents’ winnings from in-state lotteries and residents’ winnings from all
lotteries, with no credit for taxes paid to other states. See Eby v. New Hampshire,
96 A.3d 942 (N.H. 2014).
135
Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
136
Id. at 1803–04.
137
MD. TAX-GEN. CODE ANN. § 10-105 (2005); Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1793.
138
§ 10-106(a)(1).
139
Id. at § 10-106.1.
140
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Blanton, 890 A.2d 279, 287–88 (2006);
see also § 10-703(a).
141
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803.
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emphasized.142 However, the Court did not fully elucidate
nondiscrimination but simply equated it with internal consistency.
Unfortunately, the context of Wynne—the provision of credits for
taxes paid to other states—is one of the few contexts in which state
taxes are interdependent and internal consistency therefore diverges
from Commerce Neutrality.143
In a five-four opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court struck
down Maryland’s tax system because it was internally inconsistent
and therefore discriminatory.144 The Court distinguished the
multiple taxation that resulted from such discrimination from the
constitutionally permissible multiple taxation that may arise from
interactions between states’ internally consistent nondiscriminatory
tax systems.145 On a similar note, the Court alluded to “the critical
142
The respondents’ brief stated the question in the case as “whether a state
tax that exposes interstate commerce to double taxation is saved from invalidation
under the Commerce Clause merely because the State imposes the tax upon its
own residents.” Brief for Respondents, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No. 13-485).
143
See supra Section III.A.
144
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804 (“[T]he internal consistency test reveals what
the undisputed economic analysis shows: Maryland’s tax scheme is inherently
discriminatory and operates as a tariff.”); see Tax Economists Brief, supra note
12; see Knoll-Mason Brief, supra note 57.
145
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1803–04 (stating that the internal consistency test
distinguishes “tax schemes that inherently discriminate against interstate
commerce without regard to the tax policies of other States” from “tax schemes
that create disparate incentives to engage in interstate commerce (and sometimes
result in double taxation) only as a result of the interaction of two different but
nondiscriminatory and internally consistent schemes”). The Court cited to Armco
as recognizing that distinction. Id. at 1803. Despite the Court’s emphasis on
discrimination, much of the early press coverage mischaracterized Wynne as a
decision against multiple taxation. See, e.g., Roger Russell, Supreme Court Strikes
Down Maryland’s Double Tax, ACCT. TODAY (May 18, 2015),
http://www.accountingtoday.com/news/tax-practice/supreme-court-strikesdown-marylands-double-tax-74637-1.html; Richard Wolf, Supreme Court: Two
States Can’t Tax the Same Income, USA TODAY (May 18, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/05/18/supreme-court-doubletaxation/22066863/; Lawrence Hurly & Will Dunham, U.S. Top Court Rules
Against Maryland Over Double Taxation, REUTERS (May 18, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/18/us-usa-court-taxidUSKBN0O31G620150518. Some of the legal commentary described the
decision in similar terms. See, e.g., Jasper Cummings, Internal Consistency and
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distinction, recognized in cases like Armco, between discriminatory
tax schemes and double taxation that results only from the
interaction of two different but nondiscriminatory tax schemes.”146
The Court also disposed of a discredited dictum stating that “it is not
a purpose of the Commerce Clause to protect state residents from
their own state taxes,”147 noting that it had “repudiated that dictum”
in an earlier decision and that the dictum “must bow to the holdings
of [the] many cases entertaining Commerce Clause challenges
brought by residents.”148
Although the principal dissent objected to the Court’s supposed
holding “that one of two States, the domiciliary State or the source
State, must recede simply because both have lawful tax regimes
reaching the same income,”149 the Court’s decision made clear that
states with internally consistent (“lawful”) tax systems need not
provide credits for other states’ taxes or otherwise recede to their
systems.150 Rather, states with internally inconsistent systems,
which are discriminatory and therefore not lawful, must remedy the
inconsistency, through a credit or otherwise.151 Because the internal
consistency test applies symmetrically to residence and source

the Federal Income Tax, 148 TAX NOTES 99, 103, 105 (2015) (contending that
the Court “basically” viewed double taxation as a problem and describing internal
consistency test as “hypothetical mathematical analysis” that the Court used as a
“makeweight”).
146
Id. at 1804.
147
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 266 (1989).
148
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798 (citing W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512
U.S. 186, 202–03 (1994)). The dictum had drawn sustained criticism from
commentators. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, West Lynn Creamery and the
Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives, 65 TAX NOTES 619, 621 (1994)
[hereinafter Hellerstein, West Lynn Creamery and the Constitutionality of State
Tax Incentives] (referring to dictum as “ill-considered”); SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM
IN TAXATION, supra note 5, at 45–46 (noting that consistent adherence to the
dictum without formalistic distinctions “would . . . eliminate most [DCC]
scrutiny”); BLOOMBERG BNA, TAX MANAGEMENT MULTISTATE TAX REPORT 2
(2015) (quoting Richard Pomp, “I know of no academic who ever thought [the]
dictum was correct”).
149
Id. at 1813 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
150
Id. at 1805.
151
Id. at 1805–06.

512

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

taxation, the Court did not establish a “rule of priority” favoring
source taxation.152
Regrettably, the Court did not explain the relationship of the
internal consistency test to the tax-rate condition involving the
combined tax burden on inbound and outbound transactions. Rather
than presenting even a short summary of the economic analysis
supporting the internal consistency test, the Court simply referred
readers to the Tax Economists Brief and the Knoll-Mason Brief.153
Indeed, the principal dissent accurately complained that the majority
offered no economic analysis “beyond citation to a pair of amicus
briefs.”154
Because it equated neutrality with internal consistency, the
Court did not mention, and may not have recognized that, in the
context of credits for taxes paid to other states, internal consistency
is insufficient to achieve complete neutrality.155 As a result, the
Court did not identify the lingering discrimination that remains in
place even with full credits. That discrimination should have been
recognized, even if it would not be desirable to invalidate systems
that offer full credits.
The Wynne Court rejected Maryland’s partial-credit system that
resulted in both discrimination and multiple taxation.156 It also
rejected the taxpayers’ argument that each state has an unconditional
duty to prevent multiple taxation, even if its tax system is neutral.157
Instead, the Court held that states could still discriminate to some
extent, provided that multiple taxation was avoided, and internal
consistency achieved, though full credits.158 That position is more
152

Id. at 1804–05.
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1802, 1804 (citing Tax Economists Brief, supra note
12; Knoll-Mason Brief, supra note 57); cf. Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in
Wynne, supra note 79, at 9 (“Interestingly, the Court never described the
economists’ precise methodology.”).
154
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1822 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155
Cf. James W. Wetzler, Fixing Discrimination in New York’s Local
Income Taxes, 77 ST. TAX NOTES 263 (2015) (explaining that it is “unclear”
whether the Court recognized the difference between internal consistency and
neutrality).
156
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1795.
157
Id. at 1804.
158
Id. at 1806.
153
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lenient than a complete commitment to Commerce Neutrality,
which would invalidate state income tax systems that rely on credits
to achieve internal consistency. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to
refrain from invalidating such longstanding and widespread state
practices.
The Wynne plaintiffs did not ask the Court to invalidate
discriminatory state income tax systems that provide full credits, nor
did the Tax Economists’ brief or the Knoll-Mason brief. Their
reticence was well founded, as it would be unwise for the Court to
strike down such a widespread and longstanding practice. The Court
properly reject Maryland’s partial-credit system, which was
significantly more discriminatory than full-credit systems and
lacked the latter’s historical pedigree.159 Regrettably, however, the
Court did not explain that full credits are insufficient for complete
neutrality and that they are acceptable in the personal income tax
context only because of their historical provenance. Instead, as
noted above, the Court emphasized that full credits are sufficient for
internal consistency, neglecting to mention that they are insufficient
for neutrality.
D. The Path Forward After Wynne
The Court should accept discriminatory income tax systems that
include both residence and source taxes, with residents’ in-state
income taxed only once, so long as the state provides a full credit
for taxes paid to other states.160 Although necessitated by history,
the acceptance of discriminatory personal income tax systems with
full credits raises complications that would not arise under a
complete implementation of Commerce Neutrality.
An unresolved question concerns whether states must provide
credit for income taxes imposed by municipalities in other states and
whether municipalities that impose income taxes must grant credit
for taxes imposed by other states. Under current practice, such
159

See supra text accompanying note 126 (noting that most states provide
full credits).
160
Cf. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 357 (2008) (“[T]he
fact that the system has been in force for a very long time is of itself a strong
reason . . . for leaving any improvement that may be desired to the legislature.”).
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credits are often denied.161 State and local governments will likely
seek to maintain these practices on the ground that locally collected
taxes are distinguishable from the state-collected county income tax
considered in Wynne.162 Courts should insist that taxes imposed by
a state and its subdivisions (all of which are subject to the DCC) be
aggregated.163 Of course, some local taxes are already neutral
because they are purely residence-based or purely source-based and
therefore need not provide credits.164 But, other localities impose
both source and residence taxation, with residents’ in-city income
taxed only once, and therefore must provide credits to achieve
internal consistency.165
Under current practice, credits are sometimes denied if the other
state taxes a different, but related, party than the one taxed by the
credit granting state, for example when one state taxes a trust and
the other taxes a beneficiary.166 Credit may also be denied if the
other state taxes the income in a different year than the crediting
state.167 The courts will need to wrestle with the constitutionality of
these limitations.
161

HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 400; Brief for the International
Municipal Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
17–18, Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015) (No.
13-485) (citing examples of states denying credit for out-of-state local taxes and
localities denying credits against their taxes for out-of-state taxes); Jonathan
Nehring, A Walk-Off Wynne for Professional Athletes, 76 ST. TAX NOTES 989,
990 (2015) (stating that such credit denials are “common”).
162
David Sawyer & Amy Hamilton, Wynne Answers 1 Question, But Raises
Many More, 76 ST. TAX NOTES 650 (2015) (quoting statement to that effect by
Veranda Smith of the Federation of Tax Administrators).
163
Cf. Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 14 (“[F]or
federal constitutional purposes, the distinction between state and local taxes has
no meaning . . . the appropriate way to analyze [local] taxes is to consider them
as part of the state’s tax structure.”); Nehring, supra note 161, at 990–91
(explaining that “it does not appear” that Wynne ruling depended on tax being
state-collected).
164
See, e.g., Wetzler, supra note 155, at 264 (noting that New York City’s
general income tax applies only to residents and need not provide credit);
Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 14.
165
See, e.g., Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 14–15
(discussing that feature of Kansas City, Missouri income tax).
166
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 399–400.
167
Id. at 397.
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Moreover, because each state provides credit only for other
states’ taxes that it recognizes as “income taxes,” variations across
states’ tax systems may preclude crediting.168 That limitation
illuminates a fundamental conceptual weakness of the concept of
multiple taxation, which condemns the imposition of two states’
taxes on a transaction only when the two taxes are similar in some
vague sense. Note that the internal consistency test permits this type
of limitation on credits because it assumes that other states’ tax
systems are similar (indeed identical) to the challenged tax system.
Courts must resist a formalistic application of internal consistency
that would enable states to impose discriminatory taxes on narrow
income categories while providing credits only for other states’
taxes that have an identically narrow scope.169
None of these questions would arise if the Court insisted that
each state impose personal income taxes that satisfy Commerce
Neutrality, regardless of what other states do. Nevertheless, as
discussed above, an insistence on complete neutrality is precluded
by historical experience. On the other hand, unrestricted latitude for
discriminatory personal income taxation would lead to economic
and political Balkanization. Accordingly, courts must confront the
above issues in the personal-income-tax context, unless Congress
uses its Commerce Clause authority to resolve some or all of them.
To avoid these complications in other contexts, however, the
Court must make clear that full credits for taxes paid to other states
are generally insufficient to rehabilitate otherwise discriminatory
tax systems. Full credits should be allowed to play that role only
when sanctioned by longstanding historical practice, as is true in the
context of personal income taxation and perhaps sales and use
taxation.170 States should not be allowed to undermine the DCC by
rehabilitating patently discriminatory taxes through the provision of
narrow credits for identical taxes paid to other states. For example,
a tax system that includes both an import and an export tariff should
168

Id. at 400.
Cf. Wetzler, supra note 155, at 264–65 (urging that such a formalistic
approach be avoided in designing potential credit against New York City’s
unincorporated business tax).
170
States that impose use taxes on goods brought into the state generally
grant credit for sales or use taxes paid to other states in which the goods were
previously sold or used. HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 712–14.
169
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not be upheld merely because it offers credit against the tariffs for
any tariffs imposed by other states.171
Another source of discrimination in personal income taxation
arises from states’ residence definitions. Many states subject an
individual to residence taxation if she is domiciled in the state or if
she spends a specified number of days, often 183, in the state.172
Such a definition is internally inconsistent and discriminatory; if
every state adopted such a definition, an individual domiciled in one
state and spending the majority of her time in another state would
pay higher nationwide tax than someone who was domiciled and
spent the majority of her time within a single state. Wynne’s
revitalization of the internal consistency test provides a clear path to
invalidate these internally inconsistent definitions.173
V. FACIAL AND DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION
Policies that satisfy the tax-rate condition (1) are facially neutral
between interstate and intrastate commerce. In some cases,
171

New York has sought to rehabilitate an internally inconsistent tax based
on capital or New York-based gross receipts by providing a credit for taxes paid
to other states. Wetzler, supra note 155, at 266 n.16 (discussing New York Tax
Law section 210-B.42). Commentators have recognized that credits cannot be
used to cure DCC violations arising from internally inconsistent business income
apportionment formulas. See, e.g., Hellerstein, Internal Consistency, supra note
89, at 186.
172
HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 351–53; Hellerstein, Court’s
Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 15; Arthur S. Rosen, Wynne, Cloud
Computing, and a State’s Deference to Another, 76 ST. TAX NOTES 745, 745–46
(2015) (discussing New York’s internally inconsistent residence definition,
upheld in Matter of John S. Tamagini, 91 N.Y.2d 530 (1998) and New York City’s
similar definition); Wetzler, supra note 155, at 265; see Edward Zelinsky, The
Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797, 817–18 (2016) [hereinafter
Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne].
173
Cf. Hellerstein, Court’s Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 16 (“Wynne
has almost certainly increased the vulnerability of internally inconsistent
residence definitions.”); Zelinsky, The Enigma of Wynne, supra note 172, at 819
(finding that Wynne “challenges [the] traditional understanding” that such
definitions pose no constitutional problem); Rosen, supra note 172, at 745 (noting
that Wynne creates “significant doubt” about validity of such definitions). But cf.
Wetzler, supra note 155, at 265 (noting that the impact of Wynne on residence
definitions is “matter of speculation”).
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however, facially neutral policies should be struck down because
they result in de facto discrimination against interstate commerce.
Commerce Neutrality adopts a pragmatic approach to identifying
these discriminatory policies. Before discussing such policies, it is
useful to address the confusion about the meaning of facial
discrimination.
A. Understanding Facial Discrimination
The Court has stated that measures that facially discriminate
against interstate commerce are almost always invalid, but has not
been clear about what facial discrimination means.174 Commerce
Neutrality classifies a tax as facially discriminatory if a violation of
the tax-rate condition (1) is apparent on the face of the statute.175
The Court has sometimes used the term in this sense. In Tyler Pipe
v. Washington, the Court said that the tax invalidated in Armco was
“discriminatory on its face” and implied that the same was true of
the similar tax before it.176 Confusingly, however, the Court also
said that the taxes “appeared” to be nondiscriminatory.177
Under an alternative, formalistic, definition, a tax is facially
discriminatory only if it singles out interstate transactions by
name.178 That definition makes a tax system’s classification depend
on its label, reviving the formalism repudiated in Complete Auto.179
Consider three tax systems. The first is a 20% uniform destination
tax, accompanied by a 20% export tariff; here, the export tariff is
facially discriminatory. The second is a 20% uniform origin tax,
accompanied by a 20% import tariff; here, the import tariff is
facially discriminatory. The third is a 20% tax that applies to any
174

See, e.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996); Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994); Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
175
See supra Section II.B.
176
Tyler Pipe v. Washington, 483 U.S. 232, 241 (1987).
177
Id. at 241, 247–48.
178
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying on formalistic definition to conclude that the
Maryland income tax system did “not discriminate on its face against interstate
commerce” and should be upheld).
179
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977).
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good that is either purchased or sold by an in-state party. Under the
formalistic definition, the third system is not facially discriminatory
because it does not explicitly refer to imports or exports. Yet, all
three tax systems are identical, apart from their labeling, as each of
them imposes a 20% tax on imports, a 20% tax on exports, and a
20% tax on intrastate transactions. The tax-rate condition (1) rightly
condemns all three variants on their face.
In Wynne, the Court appeared to entertain the possibility that the
Maryland tax system “might have the advantage of appearing
nondiscriminatory,” but insisted that it had to be struck down
because it “operates as a tariff and discriminates against interstate
commerce.”180 The Court said that the DCC regulates “effects, not
motives” and that the tax system could not be upheld even if it was
“not actually intended to discriminate against interstate
commerce.”181 That is the right policy for facially discriminatory
taxes, but things are more complicated when facially neutral taxes
result in de facto discrimination against interstate commerce.
B. De Facto Discrimination
Facially neutral policies that apply only to particular transactions
or taxpayers can sometimes impede interstate commerce. When
such an effect is significant and does not arise from a legitimate state
purpose, the tax should be viewed as a form of de facto
discrimination against interstate commerce. It is simplest to discuss
this issue in the context of taxes on the sale or purchase of particular
goods.
Suppose that state A imposes a facially neutral destination tax
(with the same tax rate on imports and intrastate transactions) on a
good that it imports (and does not export) from state A, perhaps
potatoes. As we explained in section II.C, there are potential price
changes for which a destination tax leaves everyone’s incentives to
engage in interstate commerce unchanged. As was shown in Table
1, that outcome requires a price increase for both intrastate
purchases and imports of potatoes that fully reflects the tax.182 Then,
180
181
182

Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1804–05.
Id. at 1801 n.4.
See supra Section II.C.
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no group of buyers or sellers has an incentive to switch between
interstate and intrastate transactions in potatoes.
Nevertheless, switching from interstate to intrastate transactions
is likely to occur in the overall economy. State-A buyers will switch
from potatoes, which the tax has made more expensive, to untaxed
goods. Potato imports will fall as part of the reduction in potato
purchases, reducing interstate commerce. Purchases of other goods,
some of which are exported, will rise. The increase in purchases of
exported goods causes a reduction in exports (as more goods are
sold at home rather than in other states), further reducing interstate
commerce.
A destination tax that applies to a balanced mix of goods that the
state imports and goods that it exports does not have these effects.
To be sure, the taxed goods still become more expensive, buyers still
switch from those goods to untaxed goods, and the reduction in
purchases of those taxed goods that the state imports still reduces
imports. However, the reduction in purchases of those taxed goods
that the state exports increases exports. There is no reason to expect
a systematic reduction in interstate transactions.
Like a destination tax on a good that the state imports, an origin
tax on a good that the state exports tends to reduce interstate
transactions. State-A sellers will switch from production of the
exported good, thereby reducing exports, to production of untaxed
goods, some of which are goods that the state imports, thereby
reducing imports.
In summary, interstate commerce is generally reduced when
states impose destination taxes on goods that it imports and origin
taxes on goods that it exports. But, not all such taxes should be
considered discriminatory. States often have permissible reasons to
impose destination and origin taxes on some products but not others.
For example, a state that happens to be a tobacco importer may
impose a destination tax on tobacco to address the health effects
arising from tobacco consumption within its borders. The tax is
permissible because the state has a legitimate reason, unrelated to
the fact that the state imports tobacco, for treating tobacco
consumption differently from other consumption.
It will often be difficult to determine whether the state has a
legitimate reason. As the Court commented in a different state tax
context, “[d]iscrimination cases sometimes do raise knotty
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questions about whether and when dissimilar treatment is
adequately justified . . . hard calls can arise.”183 Although the Court
has refused to inquire into legislators’ motives in some contexts,184
it is probably useful to consider both purpose and effect in this
context, as the Court has done in cases challenging state regulations
under the DCC.185 Indeed, in one DCC tax-and-subsidy case, the
Court noted the need “for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of
purpose and effects.”186 The Court should generally defer to state
tax policies, but should strike down laws that are clearly intended to
reduce interstate trade by taxing the consumption of goods that the
state imports or the production of goods that it exports.
The Court has vacillated between various levels of deference. In
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, the Court appropriately struck down
Hawaii’s destination liquor tax that exempted certain liquors
produced only in Hawaii, noting that it was “undisputed that the
purpose of the exemption was to aid Hawaiian industry.”187 The
Court may have been excessively deferential in Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana when it upheld Montana’s origin tax on coal,
downplaying the fact that roughly 90% of Montana coal was
exported from the state.188 The Court appropriately rejected a claim
of de facto discrimination in General Motors v. Tracy, where Ohio’s
destination tax on natural gas exempted some sales by regulated
utilities that were primarily in-state, but not sales by private
suppliers that were primarily out-of-state.189 The Court found that
the complexity and pervasive federal regulation of the utility
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CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 U.S. 277, 297 (2011)
(discussing 4-R Act).
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See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1930) (citing eleven cases,
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U.S. 44, 55 (1998); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951).
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See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662,
671–78 (1981) (Powell, J.) (plurality opinion) (striking down Iowa’s truck length
limit based on both purpose and effects).
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W. Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994).
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Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984).
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Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1981).
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markets was a permissible reason to distinguish between the two
types of companies.190
Rather than targeting products, a state can target taxpayers. For
example, interstate transactions will be reduced if a state imposes a
facially neutral destination tax only on a group of taxpayers who
primarily engage in inbound transactions or a facially neutral origin
tax only on a group of taxpayers who primarily engage in outbound
transactions. The principles discussed above also apply in that
context.
VI. OUT-OF-STATER EQUALITY AND SUBSIDIES
The Commerce Neutrality framework’s greatest contribution
may be that it eliminates the confusion between neutral treatment of
interstate and intrastate transactions—the relevant objective under
the framework—and neutral treatment of in-state and out-of-state
parties—an objective that no sensible tax or subsidy system can
satisfy due to the inherent differences between in-state and out-ofstate parties. Eliminating that confusion also resolves the quagmire
that the Court and commentators have encountered in addressing
subsidies.
The Court has sometimes described the DCC as requiring states
to treat in-staters and out-of-staters equally.191 It has sometimes
suggested that this principle is identical to nondiscrimination against
interstate commerce.192 In other cases, the Court has viewed
190

Id. at 297–98, 303, 307.
The Court has said that the relevant DCC question is whether a tax
“discriminates against out-of-state businesses.” Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of
Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 361. Furthermore, it said that the DCC prohibits tax
measures that “give . . . residents an advantage in the marketplace” by “conferring
a commercial advantage over out-of-state competitors.” New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). Finally, the Court said that the DCC
prohibits measures that impose “greater burdens on economic activities taking
place outside the State.” Westinghouse Elect. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 404
(1984).
192
The Court has referred interchangeably to measures that “discriminate
against interstate commerce” and “measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” Associated Indus. of Mo. v.
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1994) (quoting New Energy, 486 U.S. at 273–
74). Furthermore, the Court has defined discrimination “against interstate
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Commerce Neutrality and out-of-stater equality as separate
limitations, both of which must be satisfied by state taxes.193 A
recent dissenting opinion recognized that neutrality toward
interstate commerce is the right standard, saying that “the critical
issue is whether the challenged legislation discriminates against
interstate commerce” and that it is unimportant “whether those
harmed by it reside entirely outside the State.”194
In reality, there is no equivalence between a requirement that
states be neutral between transactions that cross state lines and that
they not discriminate against out-of-state parties. Commerce neutral
taxes actually discriminate against in-staters and commerce neutral
subsidies discriminate against out-of-staters. In contrast, import and
export tariffs, the prototypical policies that discriminate against
interstate commerce, are actually neutral between in-staters and outof-staters, despite what initial appearances may suggest. A
requirement that taxes and subsidies not discriminate against out-ofstaters would lead to unacceptable results, validating tariffs and
invalidating most subsidies.
Ironically, the problematic implications of the out-of-staterequality principle have been widely recognized, particularly its
implication that virtually all state subsidies violate the DCC.195
Indeed, critics of the DCC have repeatedly argued that the principle
cannot be given a coherent interpretation and that the DCC should

commerce” as “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic
interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” Or. Wastes Sys. Inc. v.
Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (alteration in original) (citation
omitted). Some commentators and foreign courts have also treated the two criteria
as interchangeable. See, e.g., SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN TAXATION, supra note 5,
at 42, 44–45, 47–48 (referring to “discrimination against outsiders or interstate
commerce” repeatedly). The European Court of Justice has held that member
nations may not discriminate against nonresidents relative to residents or
discriminate against residents’ cross-border activity relative to their domestic
activity. Mason, supra note 80, at 1285–86.
193
Bacchus Imports Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 n.8 (“[D]iscrimination
between in-state and out-of-state goods is as offensive to the Commerce Clause
as discrimination between in-state and out-of-state taxpayers.”).
194
United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Onedia-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt.
Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 370 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting).
195
See infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
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therefore be abandoned.196 Supporters of the DCC have also
displayed awareness of the out-of-stater-equality principle’s
problems and have devised formalistic distinctions (particularly the
tax-subsidy distinction) in a futile effort to allow the DCC to limp
along while shackled to the principle.197
The problems with the out-of-stater equality principle do not
require abandonment of the DCC. Instead, they require the
abandonment of the out-of-stater equality principle, which offers
incoherent policy prescriptions, has no grounding in the text of the
Commerce Clause or in the Complete Auto test, and impedes rather
than promotes the DCC’s purpose of preventing Balkanization.
Shorn of this ill-conceived principle, the DCC can function perfectly
well as a requirement that states not discriminate against interstate
commerce. Moreover, that requirement can be applied impartially
to taxes and subsidies.
A. Incoherence of the Out-of-Stater-Equality Principle
A few simple examples readily demonstrate that Commerce
Neutrality and out-of-stater equality yield dramatically different
results and that the latter principle’s results, particularly its
validation of export and import tariffs and its invalidation of
commonplace state subsidies, are unacceptable.
1. Tariffs Do Not “Discriminate” Against Out-ofStaters
The paradigm examples of taxes that violate the tax-rate
condition and penalize interstate transactions are import tariffs that
apply only to inbound transactions and export tariffs that apply only
to outbound transactions.198 Yet, the consistent application of the
out-of-stater equality principle would uphold import and export
tariffs because, contrary to common intuitions, tariffs treat in-staters
and out-of-staters equally.
196

See, e.g., Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the DCC, supra note 5, at 36.
See sources cited infra note 231.
198
See, e.g., Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787,
1804 (“[T]ariffs are the paradigmatic example of a law discriminating against
interstate commerce.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
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To see this point, consider an analytically identical example that
is uncontaminated by preconceptions about tariffs. Suppose that a
state’s residents were divided into two groups, reds and greens, and
that the tax system described in Table 5 was imposed on their
transactions.
TABLE 5: HYPOTHETICAL TWENTY PERCENT
TAX
Red Seller
Green Seller
Red Buyer
Zero
20 percent
Green Buyer
Zero
Zero
Because the tax treats the two groups symmetrically, they
necessarily receive equal treatment. There is no sense in which reds
receive better treatment than greens or vice versa. Transactions
between two reds are treated the same as transactions between two
greens; both are exempt. The unfavorable treatment of one type of
transaction between the two groups does not favor either group over
the other. The tax favors red sellers (whose sales are always exempt)
over green sellers (for whom one type of sale is taxed), but it also
favors green buyers (whose purchases are always exempt) over red
buyers (for whom one type of purchase is taxed).
Now, consider a 20% import tariff, as shown in Table 6.
TABLE 6: TWENTY PERCENT IMPORT TARIFF
In-State Seller
Out-of-State
Seller
In-State Buyer
Zero
20 percent
Out-of-State
Zero
Zero
Buyer
Table 6 is identical to Table 5, except that greens are now instaters and reds are now out-of-staters. The import tariff does not
discriminate against out-of-staters any more than the tax in Table 5
discriminated against reds. In-staters and out-of-staters receive
symmetrical treatment. Transactions between two in-staters are
treated the same as transactions between two out-of-staters; both are
exempt. The unfavorable treatment of one type of transaction
between the two groups does not favor either group over the other.
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The tax favors in-state sellers (whose sales are always exempt) over
out-of-state sellers (for whom one type of sale is taxed), but it also
favors out-of-state buyers (whose purchases are always exempt)
over in-state buyers (for whom one type of purchase is taxed). It is
straightforward to show that a similar analysis applies to export
tariffs.
An import tariff’s flaw is not that it penalizes out-of-state
production relative to in-state production; instead, its flaw is that it
penalizes out-of-state production only when the buyer is in-state and
thereby penalizes interstate transactions.199 In contrast, an export
tariff actually penalizes in-state production relative to out-of-state
production. Its flaw is that it penalizes in-state production only when
the buyer is out-of-state and thereby penalizes interstate
transactions. Commerce Neutrality allows states to favor or disfavor
in-state production if they do so for all buyers or to favor or disfavor
in-state buyers if they do so for all sellers.200
Tariffs treat in-staters and out-of-staters equally, but destination
taxes discriminate against in-staters. Transactions between two instaters are taxed while those between two out-of-staters are
exempt.201 The destination tax favors out-of-state buyers, whose
purchases are never taxed, over in-state buyers, whose purchases are
always taxed. The tax therefore bears more heavily on in-staters, as
one would expect for a tax on their purchases.
Origin taxes also discriminate against in-staters, as transactions
between two in-staters are taxed while those between two out-ofstaters are exempt. The tax favors out-of-state sellers, whose sales
are never taxed, over in-state sellers, whose sales are always taxed.
The tax therefore bears more heavily on in-staters, as one would
expect for a tax on their sales.
The failures of the out-of-stater-equality principle arise from its
conjunction with the nexus requirement, which requires that
extraterritorial transactions between two out-of-staters be
untaxed.202 Equal treatment would require that transactions between
two in-staters also not be taxed, which would leave only interstate
199
200
201
202

See supra Section II.B.
Cf. Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1070–71.
See supra Table 1.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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transactions to be taxed. Complying with the out-of-stater-equality
principle would therefore require discrimination against interstate
commerce.
The vice of tariffs is not that they discriminate against out-ofstaters, which they do not, but that they discriminate against
interstate commerce. Transactions between in-staters and out-ofstaters are taxed more heavily than transactions within each group.
Similarly, the vice of the tax in Table 5 is that transactions between
reds and greens are taxed more heavily than transactions within each
group. If the Court were to consistently apply the out-of-staterequality principle, it would uphold import and export tariffs.
Presumably, it would also uphold destination and origin taxes,
because they discriminate against in-staters, not against out-ofstaters. As a result, there would be no DCC scrutiny of state tax
systems. Consistent application of the principles to subsidies,
however, would be even more problematic.
2. Subsidies “Discriminate” Against Out-of-Staters
All realistic subsidies to goods and services violate out-of-stater
equality. First, consider destination subsidies, which apply to
purchases by in-staters, either from each other or from out-ofstaters. Such subsidies “discriminate” against out-of-staters, as
transactions between two in-staters, but not those between two outof-staters, are subsidized. The subsidy favors in-state buyers, whose
purchases are always subsidized, over out-of-state buyers, whose
purchases are never subsidized. The subsidy therefore favors instaters, as one would expect for a subsidy to their purchases.
Consider origin subsidies, which apply to sales by in-staters,
either to each other or to out-of-staters. These subsidies also
“discriminate” against out-of-staters, as transactions between two
out-of-staters, but not those between two in-staters, are subsidized.
The subsidy favors in-state sellers, whose sales are always
subsidized, over out-of-state sellers, whose sales are never
subsidized. The subsidy therefore favors in-staters, as one would
expect for a subsidy to their sales.
The crucial feature of both subsidies is the zero subsidy rate for
extraterritorial transactions. Just as the lack of a tax on
extraterritorial transactions caused commerce neutral taxes to
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“discriminate” against in-staters, the lack of a subsidy to
extraterritorial transactions causes commerce neutral subsidies to
“discriminate” against out-of-staters. Although the zero subsidy rate
for extraterritorial transactions is not constitutionally required, no
state will bestow its largesse on transactions to which its citizens are
not parties. The application of the out-of-stater-equality principle to
subsidies would lead to the unacceptable conclusion that the state
must subsidize the entire world by aiding extraterritorial
transactions on the same terms as intrastate transactions.203
Further problems arise because subsidies are merely negative
taxes.204 A 10% destination tax, which is valid, is equivalent to a
20% destination tax and a 10% destination subsidy.205 But, the latter
combination would be invalid under the out-of-stater-equality
principle because the subsidy discriminates against out-of-staters.
Indeed, simply reducing a destination tax from 20% to 10% could
be viewed as discriminatory; because destination taxes discriminate
against in-staters, reducing those taxes discriminates in favor of
them. Similar conclusions would also hold for origin taxes. Police
and fire protection and other public services provided only to instaters would also be discriminatory.
It should not be surprising that state taxes tend to “discriminate”
against in-staters, the parties whom the state has authority to tax, and
that state subsidies tend to “discriminate” against out-of-staters,
whom the state has no obligation to serve.
The Court has sometimes flirted with the principle of locational
neutrality, which requires that taxes not distort where production
occurs.206 The Court stated in one case that import tariffs are
impermissible because they have the effect of “artificially
encouraging in-state production even when the same goods can be
produced at lower cost in other States” and having “distorting effects
on the geography of production.”207 Because locational neutrality is
satisfied by destination taxes and subsidies (residence taxes and
203
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subsidies in the income-tax context),208 it avoids many of the
problems posed by the out-of-stater equality principle.209 But, it
would still preclude origin-based subsidies, such as the business
incentive discussed below, and origin-based services such as police
and fire protection.210 In any event, there is no constitutional basis
for invalidating origin-based subsidies; they do not discriminate
against inbound transactions, even though the latter are not
subsidized. Because origin subsidies apply to outbound as well as
intrastate transactions, they need not also apply to inbound
transactions. The point resembles our conclusion that origin taxes
do not favor inbound over intrastate transactions; because the taxes
apply to outbound transactions, they need not also apply to inbound
transactions.211
Many commentators have noted that the out-of-stater-equality
principle casts doubt on the validity of nearly all state subsidies.212
Because the Court has failed to distinguish out-of-stater equality
from Commerce Neutrality, its treatment of subsidies has led it into
a quagmire.
B. The Subsidy Quagmire
The Court has generally recognized that some subsidies violate
the DCC, but has not been clear about which ones do so.
Commentators have trenchantly criticized the Court’s lack of clarity
and have suggested that the DCC should not apply to subsidies.213
But, these difficulties arise only under the out-of-stater-equality
208

Mason & Knoll, Tax Discrimination, supra note 55, at 1046.
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See supra Section III.A.
212
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principle, and vanish under Commerce Neutrality, which draws the
same clear distinction between permissible and impermissible
subsidies that applies to taxes and permits the application of the
internal consistency test.
1. Trying to Square the Circle
The DCC treatment of subsidies and tax incentives for in-state
production is important because such provisions remain
widespread,214 despite questions about their effectiveness and
desirability.215 If the DCC requires equal treatment of out-of-state
parties and production, nearly all of these incentives are vulnerable
to challenge.216 To be sure, potential plaintiffs sometimes lack
standing to challenge these programs. In Daimler Chrysler v. Cuno,
the Supreme Court ruled that state taxpayers challenging an Ohio
investment tax credit lacked Article III standing to sue in federal
court based on its prior holdings that federal and state taxpayers do
not have a sufficiently concrete and personalized interest to supply
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See, e.g., Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-CUNO
Litigation Landscape, 58 CASE W. L. REV. 1157, 1157–58 (2008); Christopher
Klimmek, Challenging State Investment Tax Credits After DaimlerChrysler Corp.
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standing to challenge spending programs.217 Cuno significantly
restricts challenges to business tax incentives, although it does not
necessarily preclude challenges in state courts with standing rules
more lenient than Article III, as well as challenges by municipal
taxpayers (who are not subject to the limits on state-taxpayer
standing) and out-of-state companies.218
Regardless of who may have standing, however, a coherent
DCC jurisprudence must provide clear guidance on which subsidies
and incentives are valid and which are not. The Court has failed to
supply clear guidance in this area. It has recognized that the DCC
allows states to subsidize in-state sellers to make the state a more
attractive place to do business, stating that it is a “laudatory goal in
the design of a tax system to promote investment that will provide
jobs and prosperity to the citizens of the taxing State”219 and that it
is “undisputed that States may try to attract business by creating an
environment conducive to economic activity.”220 But, it has not
made clear how these permissible measures can be distinguished
from impermissible measures. Commerce Neutrality provides that
distinction.
The Court has sometimes flirted with the unsustainable position
that cash subsidies should be treated differently from tax reductions.
In Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison, the Court suggested,
without resolving the issue, that the DCC might permit Maine to
subsidize only in-state camps serving residents if it provided direct
cash payments rather than tax exemptions.221 In New Energy Co. v.
217
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Limbach, the Court said that “direct subsidization of domestic
industry does not ordinarily run afoul of” the DCC, but that
“discriminatory taxation of out-of-state manufacturers does.”222
Commentators under the thrall of the out-of-stater-equality
principle have also been unable to provide clear guidance on
subsidies.223 Because commentators have been unwilling to accept
that all subsidies are permissible (which would permit any
discriminatory tax reduction to escape DCC scrutiny by being
relabeled as a subsidy) or that all of them are impermissible,224 they
have been drawn to a variety of ill-defined principles for
distinguishing permissible from impermissible subsidies.225 This
doctrinal confusion has led to severe uncertainty about the validity
of numerous business incentives. One commentator notes that “the
constitutionality of state investment tax credits presents a hard case
whose outcome is difficult to predict—an undesirable situation
when billions of dollars of foregone tax revenue depend on the
outcome.”226
This confusion exists because subsidies cannot be coherently
judged under the out-of-stater-equality principle. The solution is to
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jettison that principle227 and instead judge both taxes and subsidies
on the basis of Commerce Neutrality. Like taxes, subsidies are
commerce neutral if, and only if, the combined treatment of inbound
and outbound transactions is at least as favorable as the treatment of
intrastate transactions.
2. Commerce Neutrality to the Rescue
The tax-rate condition (1) applies without modification to
subsidies, with subsidy rates treated as negative tax rates. The
subsidy to intrastate transactions can be no greater than the
combined subsidy to inbound and outbound transactions, similar to
the neutrality condition for taxes. Destination and origin subsidies
are commerce neutral for the same reason that destination and origin
taxes are neutral. Because destination and origin subsidies are both
commerce neutral, a combination of them is also commerce neutral.
The irrelevance of multiple taxation, which we discussed in section
II.D, also carries over to this context; if state A provides an originbased subsidy and state B provides a destination-based subsidy,
Commerce Neutrality holds even though a sale from B to A receives
no subsidy.228
Commerce Neutrality is identical to internal consistency so long
as a state’s subsidies do not depend on other states’ policies. A
subsidy is valid if its universal adoption by all states would result in
no greater subsidy for transactions within a state than for
transactions between states.
States may provide extravagant subsidies to their citizens
without having to subsidize extraterritorial transactions. But, if
intrastate transactions are subsidized, then an equal subsidy must be
provided, in combination, to inbound and outbound transactions.
For example, a state may provide as large a subsidy as it wishes to
residents’ apples purchases while refusing to give a penny to aid
nonresidents’ apples purchases. The subsidy must nevertheless
apply to the apples residents import from nonresidents as well as the
227

Other constitutional clauses, such as privileges and immunities and equal
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apples they buy from fellow residents. A state may generously
subsidize the production and sale of apples by residents without
helping nonresidents who produce and sell apples, but the subsidy
must apply to apples exported to nonresidents as well as to apples
sold to fellow residents.
Under Commerce Neutrality, many state subsidies would be
valid. Walter Hellerstein describes numerous subsidies for
economic activity conducted within a state, including credits for
new investment, research spending, hiring state residents, and
construction or improvement of business facilities.229 These
subsidies are permissible if they are available to everyone who
engages in these activities within the state, both those engaged in
intrastate and interstate transactions. A subsidy is invalid, however,
if it applies only when both of two activities occur within the state.
The subsidy to an intrastate transaction in which both activities are
in-state then exceeds the combined subsidies of zero that apply to
inbound and outbound transactions in which only one of the
activities occurs in-state.230 For example, discrimination occurs if a
company can receive a property tax reduction (beneficial only for
in-state property) for increasing in-state employment. Such an
incentive impedes interstate commerce by encouraging companies
to locate property and employment in a single state rather than
spreading them across different states.
Even a business incentive that applies to a single activity may be
problematic if it is nonrefundable (the incentive can only be claimed
against the taxpayer’s preexisting tax liability). Consider a
nonrefundable credit for investment within the state. A subsidy for
such investment by all parties, regardless of their other connections
with the state, is commerce neutral. But, the nonrefundable credit is
available only to those businesses that have sufficient income taxed
by the state to generate tax liability against which the credit may be
claimed. If the investment itself can be expected to generate
sufficient taxable income to absorb the credit, then the credit is
effectively available to anyone making the investment. Otherwise,
229

Hellerstein, W. Lynn Creamery and the Constitutionality of State Tax
Incentives, supra note 148, at 623–24.
230
See Enrich, supra note 214, at 439 (noting internal inconsistency for tax
preference that applies only when company operates in-state and shareholders live
in state).
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however, the credit subsidizes investment only by those with other
activities in the state (on which tax is already owed) and
discriminates against interstate commerce. The internal consistency
test again reveals the problem; if every state copies this tax system,
a business with investment in one state and other activities in a
different state pays more nationwide tax than a business that does
everything in a single state.231 Although nonrefundable tax
incentives facially depart from neutrality, they should be upheld if
the impact on interstate commerce is minor relative to the
administrative and compliance costs of making the incentive
refundable. As previously discussed, departures from neutrality are
justified if the administrative costs of achieving neutrality are too
large relative to the amounts involved.232
Facially neutral subsidies can result in de facto discrimination
against interstate commerce just as facially neutral taxes can.
Interstate commerce is reduced when a state provides origin
subsidies to goods that it imports, just as when it imposes destination
taxes on those goods; the subsidies encourage in-state production of
the goods, reducing the demand for imports of the goods.
Conversely, interstate commerce is reduced when a state provides
destination subsidies to goods that it exports, just as when it imposes
origin taxes on those goods; the subsidies encourage in-state
purchases of the goods, reducing the supply available for export.
Our discussion of de facto discrimination in section V.B remains
applicable here.
3. Resolving the West Lynn Creamery Enigma
This analysis resolves the perennial debate over West Lynn
Creamery v. Healy, one of the Court’s most controversial and
widely discussed DCC decisions. The state taxed all dealers of
liquid milk, in-state and out-of-state, on sales to Massachusetts
231

See id. at 436. Hellerstein and Coenen propose invalidating only those
subsidies that are framed as a reduction in preexisting tax liability and conditioned
on engaging in-state production. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 215 and
accompanying text. However, they indicate that they would invalidate a provision
framed in this manner even if the subsidy was available to out-of-state businesses
in some other form. Id. at 814–15.
232
See supra Section II.E.
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retailers, with the tax proceeds deposited in a Dairy Equalization
Fund used to pay cash subsidies to Massachusetts dairy
producers.233 The Court assumed for purposes of analysis that the
tax and subsidy would each be valid in isolation, but concluded,
“[b]y conjoining a tax and a subsidy, Massachusetts has created a
program more dangerous to interstate commerce than either part
alone”234 and struck down the tax and subsidy on the ground that
they combined to form an import tariff.235
If Massachusetts had imposed a uniform destination tax on its
residents’ purchases of all products and provided a uniform origin
subsidy to its residents’ sale of all products, that combination would
be commerce neutral because the tax and subsidy would each be
neutral. Although tax would be imposed on all of the state’s imports,
a subsidy would be provided to all of its exports. The tax-rate
condition (1) would be satisfied because the tax burden on imports
minus the subsidy to exports would equal the net tax burden on
intrastate transactions (which would both pay the tax and receive the
subsidy). Accordingly, Massachusetts’ destination tax and origin
subsidy on milk were each facially neutral, as was their
combination. The combination imposed a tax on milk imports and
provided a subsidy to milk exports while applying both the tax and
the subsidy to intrastate milk transactions.
The relevant issue was de facto discrimination. Milk was a good
that Massachusetts imported.236 As discussed above, interstate
commerce is reduced by either a destination tax or an origin subsidy
on a good that a state imports.237 It is therefore reduced by the
combination of those two measures.
The policy’s validity depended on whether Massachusetts was
discriminating against interstate commerce or whether it
incidentally reduced interstate commerce while pursuing
permissible objectives (as in the example from section V.B of a
tobacco-importing state imposing a destination tobacco tax for
233

W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 190 (citing 1992 order
issued by Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture).
234
Id. at 199–200.
235
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 196.
236
Id. at 199 n.16 (“[I]t is undisputed that an overwhelming majority of the
milk sold in Massachusetts is produced elsewhere.”).
237
See supra Sections V.B, VI.B.2.
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health reasons). It seems unlikely that Massachusetts had legitimate
reasons to discourage milk consumption or encourage milk
production, let alone both, and it seems far more likely that it had
the protectionist goal of reducing milk imports. Indeed, the state
conceded that its purpose was “preserving the Massachusetts dairy
industry,” which the Court interpreted to mean “protecting it from
the rigors of interstate competition.”238 The tax and subsidy, though
facially neutral, each had a negative effect on interstate commerce.
The state’s decision to combine the measures made it easier to
conclude that the negative effects were intended and that the state
was engaging in de facto discrimination against interstate
commerce.
VII. FAIR APPORTIONMENT AND EXTERNAL CONSISTENCY
Commerce Neutrality also permits the unification of the Court’s
jurisprudence on fair apportionment with the remainder of its DCC
jurisprudence. Apportionments are fair if they are commerce
neutral, providing a combined treatment of inbound and outbound
transactions that is at least as favorable as their treatment of
intrastate transactions. The Commerce Neutrality framework
reveals that some of the Court’s apportionment doctrines,
particularly the external consistency test and the unitary-business
principle, are misplaced, because they have no bearing on whether
apportionment systems are commerce neutral. The complications
and uncertainties posed by those doctrines therefore disappear under
Commerce Neutrality.
The Complete Auto test treats fair apportionment as separate
from nondiscrimination. The second prong in the Complete Auto test
is fair apportionment, which requires state taxes to be “properly
apportioned to local activities within the taxing [s]tate.”239 In
Complete Auto, the Supreme Court justified the fair apportionment
requirement as a means of ensuring that a state tax “does not
238

Id. at 204–05.
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 285 (1977)
(noting that precedent has “sustained a tax against Commerce Clause challenge
when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State,
is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is
fairly related to the services provided by the State”).
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undertake to tax any interstate activities carried on outside the state’s
borders.”240
As discussed below, apportionment should not be viewed as a
separate prong because unfair apportionment, properly understood,
is a form of discrimination against interstate commerce that can be
handled under the nondiscrimination prong.
A. Formulary Apportionment
The biggest debate over apportionment concerns how the
income of interstate businesses is attributed among the different
states in which they do business. States often employ formulary
apportionment to allocate the income of interstate businesses.
Under formulary apportionment, a hypothetical liability is
computed for a taxpayer based on its nationwide level of the taxed
activity, usually income.241 A fraction of that hypothetical liability
is then assigned to the taxing state based on the state’s share of one
or more other activities (the apportionment factors).242 For example,
under the traditional three-factor formula that states once commonly
used, the share of a corporation’s hypothetical nationwide income
tax liability assigned to a state equals one-third the state’s share of
sales plus one-third its share of payroll plus one-third its share of
property.243 Many states have moved away from the traditional
three-factor formula by increasing the weighting on sales, with some
adopting a single-sales-factor formula.244
An analysis of formulary apportionment yields results similar to
those obtained in section III.A: a formula satisfies Commerce
Neutrality if it is internally consistent. Suppose, for example, that a
state apportions business income based on sales and that a
240
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Id. at 282 (quoting Memphis Nat. Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96–97
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See id.
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Id. at 156; see, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
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HELLERSTEIN ET AL., supra note 124, at 469; SHAVIRO, FEDERALISM IN
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corporation has 70% of its sales in the state and 30% elsewhere. The
formula is internally consistent; if every state copied this formula
and used the same tax rate, a corporation with all of its sales in one
state would pay the same nationwide tax as one with the 70–30 split.
Moreover, the tax increase from an inbound transaction in which the
in-state sales fraction rises from 70% to 100% equals the tax savings
from an outbound transaction in which the fraction falls from 100%
to 70%, allowing incentives for both transactions to be preserved if
the tax system causes in-state returns to rise by that same amount.
Commerce Neutrality is therefore satisfied.
Although some apportionment formulas may not accurately
reflect how income is generated, that is not a DCC problem.
Inaccurate formulas generate economic inefficiencies, including
incentives and disincentives for firms to merge,245 but without more,
do not discriminate against interstate commerce. For example, a
sales-apportioned income tax, a common target of criticism,
economically resembles a sales tax in which the effective tax rate on
sales varies across companies based on their sales-to-income
ratios.246 But, the economic shortcomings of this rate variation are
not a judicial concern. Just as a direct tax on sales to residents is
commerce neutral, so too is an income tax apportioned on the basis
of those sales.
The only caveat concerns de facto discrimination. If, for
example, a state uses sales-factor apportionment for an income tax
that applies only to producers of a good that the state imports, the
tax reduces interstate commerce. That policy may be permissible or
may be de facto discrimination, depending on the factors discussed
in section V.B. Of course, the same possibility would exist for a
simple destination sales tax that applied to that industry.
Although multiple taxation may arise from divergences in states’
formulas, that is not a DCC concern, as we explained in section II.D.
245

See James R. Hines, Income Misattribution Under Formulary
Apportionment, 54 EUR. ECON. REV. 108, 110–12 (2010) (computing economic
loss from inaccurate apportionment).
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Charles E. McLure, Jr., The State Corporate Income Tax: Lambs in
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That is just as well, because it would be difficult to prevent multiple
taxation. It could be eliminated only by requiring all states to use a
single formula, perhaps the “correct” or the most widespread
formula, which would be incompatible with federalism. A more
modest restriction would allow a range of formulas, but prohibit
those outside the range. Such an approach would, at most, reduce
rather than eliminate multiple taxation while still needlessly
restricting states’ policy choices and forcing courts to make policy
judgments about permissible formulas. As discussed below, the
Court’s “external consistency” doctrine purports to follow the latter
approach, but the Court has generally paid little more than lip
service to that doctrine.247
In summary, the DCC forbids apportionment formulas that are
internally inconsistent or that result in de facto discrimination
against interstate commerce, but does not require that the formula
be “correct” or uniform across states.
B. Internal Consistency and Apportionment
The Court has long required that apportionment formulas be
internally consistent. It first mentioned the internal consistency test
in Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax Board, an
apportionment case. In that case, California’s use of the traditional
three-factor formula satisfied internal consistency because its
adoption by all states would result in a corporation being taxed once
on its full income, regardless of whether its payroll, property, and
sales were in the same state or different states.248 Even those Justices
who criticize the internal consistency test in other contexts accept
its validity in apportionment cases.249
In 1987, the Court used the internal consistency test to invalidate
flat fees on truckers.250 The Court said that where it was feasible to
apportion, states could no longer rely on its past decisions upholding
247
248

(1983).
249

See infra Section VII.C.
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169–70

See, e.g., Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 256 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S.
638, 648 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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flat, unapportioned fees.251 In 2005, however, the Court
unanimously upheld Michigan’s flat $100 tax on trucks making
commercial hauls from one location to another within the state (with
no tax on trucks that merely crossed the state on interstate hauls).252
The Court found that the use of a flat rather than per-mile fee was
appropriate because there was no evidence that the small fee had
“any significant practical burden upon interstate trade”253 and
because mileage-based apportionment would have required the state
to create a data accumulation system, indicating that “the game is
unlikely to be worth the candle.”254 The Court indicated that it was
unwilling to strike down states’ “numerous flat fees.”255
The Court has valid grounds for not insisting on burdensome
apportionment mechanisms for small fees, in accord with the
general principle that departures from neutrality are justified if the
administrative concerns of achieving full neutrality are large relative
to the taxes involved.256 However, the same latitude does not apply
to larger taxes for which administrative costs are small relative to
the taxes involved.257
C. External Consistency
The Court’s misplaced concerns with correct apportionment and
the prevention of multiple taxation has led it to a chimerical, but
half-hearted, pursuit of “external consistency.” In Container Corp.,
the Court defined external consistency as the requirement that the
251

Id. at 291–92.
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apportionment formula “actually reflect a reasonable sense of how
income is generated.”258 Recognizing the “substantial margin of
error inherent in any method” of apportionment,259 the Court said
that a state’s formula would be invalid only if it “led to a grossly
distorted result.”260 The Court accepted the traditional three-factor
formula as a benchmark for constitutional apportionment, but made
clear that variations were acceptable.261
The Court has not been clear about when apportionment is
required, permitted, or forbidden. Although it has paid lip service to
the principle that states should use apportionment formulas that
yield a reasonable approximation to correct results, it has generally
yielded to the state’s choices. When it upheld Iowa’s single-salesfactor formula in Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, the Court stated that
“the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be
rationally related to values connected with the taxing State,”262 but
devoted little attention to the merits of how Iowa allocated income.
In Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep’t of the Treasury, the Court
allowed Michigan to apportion its value added tax using the
traditional three-factor formula, rejecting the taxpayer’s contention
that specific components of value added should be allocated to the
locations in which they arose.263 Similarly, in Amerada Hess Corp.
v. Director, Div. of Taxation, N.J. Dept. of Treasury, the Court
rejected the taxpayer’s claim that it was entitled to remove discrete
components of income thought to have a clear cut location from the
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apportionment base and insist that they be allocated to that
location.264
Upholding Oklahoma’s unapportioned tax on bus tickets sold
within the state in Jefferson Lines, the Court acknowledged that it
had required apportionment for income taxes and gross receipts
taxes.265 But, the Court also noted that it had “set a different course”
for sales taxes on goods, permitting full taxation by the state in
which the sale occurs,266 and reasonably concluded that those
principles should also apply to sales taxes on services.267
While eschewing a distinction between sales taxes on goods and
sales taxes on services, the Jefferson Lines Court left intact a
distinction between sales taxes and income taxes, offering the
halfhearted rationalization that, “[a] sale of goods is most readily
viewed as a discrete event facilitated by the laws and amenities of
the place of sale, and the transaction itself does not readily reveal
the extent to which completed or anticipated interstate activity
affects the value on which the buyer is taxed.”268 The Court’s
decisions have left considerable doubt about which types of sales
and gross receipts taxes need to be apportioned, a topic on which
debate continues.269 Commerce Neutrality sweeps away these
difficulties, allowing states to impose any of these taxes in any
internally consistent manner, whether apportioned or not.
The Court’s most significant restriction on the mechanics of
apportionment is its doctrine that related companies’ activities
cannot be combined in the apportionment formula unless the
companies are carrying on a unitary business.270 The Court has
stated that limiting the apportionment formula to unitary businesses
264
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is necessary to avoid inaccurate apportionments that result in states
taxing “value or income that cannot in fairness be attributed to the
taxpayer’s activities within the State.”271 In 1992, the Court
emphatically reaffirmed a stringent version of the unitary-business
requirement, holding that a state can combine companies’ activities
in the apportionment calculation only if the companies feature
functional integration, centralization of management, and
economies of scale.272 The Court unanimously reaffirmed its strict
view in MeadWestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Department of Revenue,
holding that operational interdependence is not enough.273 The
Commerce Neutrality framework permits the unitary-business
doctrine, with all of its complications and ambiguities, to be
discarded, enabling states to apply internally consistent
apportionment formulas, whether or not a unitary business exists.
The Court needlessly invoked external consistency when it
struck down California’s interest allocation rule in Hunt-Wesson,
Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California based on its understanding
that it allocated all interest expense deductions against non-unitary
business income that California lacked the power to tax before
allocating any against unitary business income that California had
the power to tax.274 Using the language of external consistency, the
Court condemned the rule as “unrealistic” and going beyond
“reasonable bounds.”275 But, this appeal to external consistency was
unnecessary. The rule, as understood by the Court, was internally
inconsistent and could have been struck down on that ground.276
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Just as the Court has generally rejected complaints that
apportionment formulas are incorrect, it has also generally rejected
complaints that divergences between states’ formulas result in
impermissible multiple taxation. The Court commendably
recognized the irrelevance of multiple taxation in Moorman v. Bair
when it upheld Iowa’s single-factor sales formula, stating that Iowa
was no more at fault than Illinois for the fact that differences
between the two states’ formulas caused the taxpayer to be taxed by
both states.277 The Court rejected the idea that it should prevent
multiple taxation by prescribing nationally uniform apportionment
rules, concluding that the “Constitution has committed such policy
decisions” to Congress.”278 In Jefferson Lines, the Court
acknowledged the possibility of multiple taxation because sales tax
could be imposed upon delivery and income tax could be imposed
on the seller’s income,279 but said that it “found a sufficient
safeguard against the risk of impermissible multiple taxation of a
sale in the fact that it was consummated in only one State,”280 which
simply restates the internal consistency of taxing at the point of sale.
Commerce Neutrality permits a more straightforward analysis by
categorically recognizing that multiple taxation is constitutionally
innocuous, so long as each state’s apportionment system is
nondiscriminatory.
As we discussed in section IV.C, the Wynne Court made several
statements suggesting, with varying degrees of clarity, that multiple
taxation arising from divergences between nondiscriminatory tax
systems is not a DCC problem.281 If the Court fully embraces and
adheres to that key insight, external consistency and multiple
taxation are likely to play even smaller roles in future apportionment
cases.282 The Court can focus its attention on preventing
277
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discrimination against interstate commerce, the proper role of the
DCC.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we have outlined a clear analytical DCC
framework grounded in economic reality. The framework is
grounded in a single clear rule derived from economic principles: a
tax or subsidy system violates the DCC if its combined treatment of
inbound and outbound transactions is less favorable than its
treatment of intrastate transactions. Economic analysis reveals that
such a tax or subsidy system unavoidably creates economic
disincentives to engage in interstate transactions.
The Commerce Neutrality framework provides a coherent
rationale for the Court’s oft-used internal consistency test, but
discards other concerns, such as the prevention of multiple taxation
and the ill-defined concept of external consistency. It exposes the
deep flaws in the notion that the DCC requires equal treatment of
in-state and out-of-state parties. That in turn permits a coherent
resolution of the longstanding confusion about the treatment of
subsidies under the DCC, enabling them to be evaluated on the same
basis as taxes and thereby eliminating the formalistic tax-subsidy
distinction. Commerce Neutrality is also rooted in the text of the
Commerce Clause and serves the purposes of the DCC in ways that
out-of-stater equality and other standards do not. In that respect,
Commerce Neutrality puts the commerce back in the dormant
commerce clause.
In Wynne, the Court took a major step towards a coherent DCC
framework. As future cases, particularly those addressing the
validity of state subsidies and business tax incentives, arise, courts
can draw guidance from Commerce Neutrality. As we have shown
in this article, Commerce Neutrality is nimble enough to evaluate
the wide range of state policies challenged under the DCC. Adopting

Opinion in Wynne, supra note 79, at 10–11 (describing as a plausible, but not the
only, interpretation of Wynne the principle that only internally inconsistent taxes
can be invalidated as posing an unacceptable risk of multiple taxation, but that
external consistency remains as a constraint on the correctness of the
apportionment formula).
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the Commerce Neutrality framework would make the DCC a
coherent and useful part of constitutional jurisprudence.
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APPENDIX: DERIVING THE TAX-RATE CONDITIONS
Let PAA be the price (including all taxes) that buyers pay on state
A’s intrastate transactions with the taxes in place, expressed as a
ratio of the price that they would pay with no taxes. Let PBB be the
price (including all taxes) that buyers pay on state B’s intrastate
transactions with the taxes in place, expressed as a ratio of the price
that they would pay with no taxes. Let PAB be the similar ratio for
the price that state-A residents pay on purchases from state-B
residents and PBA be the ratio for the price that state-B residents pay
on purchases from state-A residents.
We denote the tax rates in the manner set forth in section III.A.
As discussed in the text, they are quoted in tax-inclusive form. Each
state’s tax rates on interstate transactions apply to the border prices
(the payments made across state lines). State A’s tax on its residents’
purchases from state-B sellers applies to the total payment made to
state B, including both the payment retained by the state-B seller
and any tax collected by the state-B government. State A’s tax on its
residents’ sales to state-B buyers applies to the payment received
from state B and does not apply to any tax payment that the state-B
buyer makes to the state-B government.
For the tax system to avoid giving anyone an incentive to switch
from interstate to intrastate transactions, four conditions must hold,
two pertaining to buyers and two pertaining to sellers.
First, the tax system must not give state-A buyers an incentive
to switch from interstate purchases from state-B residents to
intrastate purchases from other state-A residents. So, the price ratio
for interstate purchases must be no higher than the price ratio for
intrastate purchases,
(A1)

,%6 * ,%% .

Similarly, the tax system must not give state-B buyers an
incentive to switch from interstate purchases from state-A residents
to intrastate purchases from other state-B residents. So, the price
ratio for interstate purchases must be no higher than the price ratio
for intrastate purchases,
(A2)

,6% * ,66 .
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Third, the tax system must not give state-A sellers an incentive
to switch from interstate sales to state-B residents to intrastate sales
to other state-A residents. So, the after-tax payoff that state-A sellers
receive from interstate sales must fall by no more than their aftertax payoff from intrastate sales,
(A3)

,6% 51 $ +6% 351 $ 26% 3 ' ,%% 51 $ 2%% 3.

The left-hand side of (A3) states the net price received by stateA sellers on their interstate sales, after state B collects tax equal to
TBAPBA and state A collects tax of 26% ,6% 51 $ +6% 3.
Fourth, the tax system must not give state-B sellers an incentive
to switch from interstate sales to state-A residents to intrastate sales
to other state-B residents. So, the after-tax payoff that state-B sellers
receive from interstate sales must fall by no more than their aftertax payoff from intrastate sales,
(A4)

,%6 51 $ 2%6 351 $ +%6 3 ' ,66 51 $ +66 3.

The left-hand side of (A4) states the net price received by stateB sellers on their interstate sales, after state A collects tax equal to
tABPAB and state B collects tax of +%6 ,%6 51 $ 2%6 3.
We now solve for the sets of tax rates for which possible prices
exist that meet all four conditions.
First, use equation (A2) to rewrite equation (A3) as
,66 51 $ +6% 351 $ 26% 3 ' ,%% 51 $ 2%% 3, which implies,
,66 ' ,%%

1 $ 2%%
51 $ +6% 351 $ 26% 3

Then, use equation (A1) to rewrite equation (A4) as
,%% 51 $ 2%6 351 $ +%6 3 ' ,66 51 $ +66 3. Substituting in
for PBB from the preceding equation yields,
1(/00
51
.0 351(/.0 3

,%% 51 $ 2%6 351 $ +%6 3 ' ,%% 51(4

$ +66 3.

PUTTING THE COMMERCE BACK IN THE DCC
Multiplying both sides of this inequality by

51(4.0 351(/.0 3

following inequality (A5):

)00
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yields the

51 $ 2%6 351 $ +%6 351 $ +6% 351 $ 26% 3 ' 51 $ 2%% 351 $ +66 3.
So, possible prices that allow conditions (A1) through (A4) to
hold exist if, and only if, the two state’s tax rates satisfy condition
(A5). If state B imposes no taxes, then neutrality is achieved if state
A obeys the following condition:
(A6)

51 $ 26% 351 $ 2%6 3 ' 51 $ 2%% 3.

If state A imposes no taxes, then neutrality is achieved if state B
obeys the following condition:
(A7)

51 $ +6% 351 $ +%6 3 ' 51 $ +66 3.

Moreover, with both states imposing taxes, neutrality is
achieved if each state obeys its condition.
For some purposes, it is useful to rewrite the nondiscrimination
conditions (A6) and (A7). Subtracting one from both sides of each
condition and multiplying by negative one (which reverses the
direction of each inequality) yields conditions (1) and (2) presented
in section I.B. If state A exactly meets its tax-rate criterion
51 $ 26% 351 $ 2%6 3 - 51 $ 2%% 3, and state B exactly meets its taxrate criterion, 51 $ +6% 351 $ +%6 3 - 51 $ +66 3, then inequality
(A5) holds as an exact equality,
51 $ 2%6 351 $ +%6 351 $ +6% 351 $ 26% 3 - 51 $ 2%% 351 $ +66 3.
There is then a unique set of relative prices283 at which each group’s
incentives for interstate commerce are maintained. Those prices are
given by
1
1
(A8)
,%% - ,%6 , ,6% - ,66 .
1(/0.

283

1(4.0

The absolute level of prices, which would be determined by the Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy response to the state taxes, does not matter. For
example, commerce neutrality would still prevail if all prices were twice as large,
or twice as small, as those set forth in (A8).
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If tax rates exactly meeting the nondiscrimination conditions
(A6) and (A7) are imposed and if the prices stated in (A8) result,
then inequalities (A1) through (A4) all hold as exact equalities. It is
easy to see from (A8) that (A1) and (A2) hold. Condition (A3) also
holds, with state-A sellers receiving after-tax payoffs of 1 - tBA on
sales to either state-A buyers or state-B buyers. Condition (A4) also
holds, with state-B sellers receiving after-tax payoffs of 1 - TAB on
sales to either state-A buyers or state-B buyers. So, each of the four
groups has the same incentive to engage in interstate commerce with
the taxes as it did without them, as required for commerce neutrality.
The taxes are likely to cause price changes approximately equal
to the price changes set forth in (3). Otherwise, conflicting
incentives would result. Suppose, for example, that PAA was higher
than the value stated in (3) while the other prices were equal to the
values stated there. Then, state-A sellers would have an incentive to
switch into intrastate transactions and state-A buyers would have an
incentive to switch away from them. But, it is impossible for the
sellers to increase their intrastate transactions while the buyers
reduce their intrastate transactions because they are the same
transactions. So, even if the price changes differ from those given
by (3), there would be no overall disincentive to engage in interstate
transactions. For example, as noted above, if PAA was higher than
the value stated in (3) and the other prices equaled the values stated
in (3), then state-A sellers would have an incentive to switch from
interstate to intrastate transactions, but state-A buyers would have
an offsetting incentive to switch from intrastate to interstate
transactions.

